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Many of us spend a good deal of our time teaching. We 
teach courses specifically in feminist philosophy, but also 
include feminist content and teaching practices in courses 
that are not explicitly feminist. Students learn feminist 
philosophy as much from how we teach as what we teach. 
The theme of this issue is doing feminist philosophy 
in teaching feminist philosophy—in particular, in 
undergraduate teaching. This is particularly important for 
addressing the dearth of women in philosophy, since, as 
has been established, there is a fall-off of students from 
undergraduate courses to undergraduate majors. Three of 
the articles included herein address the newsletter’s theme 
directly. 
In “Navigating Epistemic Push Back in Feminist and Critical 
Race Philosophy Classes,” Alison Bailey writes that many of 
the courses that feminist philosophers teach pose classroom 
difficulties not encountered in teaching non-feminist 
philosophy courses. This is because they “implicate the self 
in . . . deeply emotional ways.” In particular, in discussions 
of material that bears on their sense of self in troubling 
ways, students “hold their ground.” Holding their ground 
can come in the form of refusal to admit gender or race 
disparity, or the use of philosophical concepts to displace 
the focus of the class. Bailey offers a strategy for dealing 
with this tendency, one from which others can benefit. She 
recommends “treating epistemic pushback as a ‘shadow’ 
text” and encourages “students to collectively navigate 
these texts alongside the assigned readings.” Bailey’s 
article shows remarkable understanding of and reflection 
on undergraduate teaching from a feminist and critical 
race theory perspective, and applies feminist principles 
and values to teachings. In particular, she engages with 
concepts of epistemic resistance and epistemologies of 
ignorance.
Crista Lebens’s essay, “Uses of Multimedia Representations 
in Undergraduate Feminist Philosophy Courses,” describes 
how she developed multimedia for teaching feminist 
philosophy in collaboration with undergraduate students. 
Both the “digital learning objects” (DLO) and the process 
of creating them apply feminist principles and values. She 
was especially influenced by Lugones in both. Lebens 
shares a link to the products of this collaboration in the 
essay. Both the DLOs and the description of the process of 
creating them are useful to all of us in our feminist teaching 
and mentoring.
In “Academic Pressures and Feminist Solutions: Teaching 
Ethics against the Grain,” Kate Parsons addresses the 
increasing emphasis on “market-based skills” as the aim 
of higher education and the way in which ethics in the 
undergraduate curriculum has traditionally been justified. 
She finds that both tend to draw attention away from the 
needs of underrepresented and oppressed groups, a 
distinctly unfeminist tendency. Parsons suggests a feminist 
pedagogical “shift” for seeking to accommodate the 
“neutrality” that the emphasis on market-based skills and 
traditional justifications for philosophy in undergraduate 
education seem to require, while still focusing on the 
needs of oppressed and underrepresented groups, which 
feminist philosophy requires. This shift seems small but 
requires a complete rethinking of the ethics syllabus. 
Parsons’s working through the competing demands on 
undergraduate philosophy teaching results in a practical 
and helpful way of rethinking one’s role as a teacher of 
philosophy.
The two other essays in this issue address different topics, 
both from one another and from the theme.
Sally Scholz’s “State of the Union: The APA Board of Officers” 
provides an explanation of the structure of the APA, with 
special focus on the history of the gender demographics of 
the APA board of officers. As she claims, the history of the 
APA helps to explain what many see as its failings. However, 
Scholz provides plenty of evidence that the APA is changing, 
and can be an instrument for change. Finally, she suggests 
what we should be doing to ensure that philosophy as a 
discipline becomes what we want it to become.
Jane Duran’s essay, “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Voice of 
Passion,” seeks to reconcile the two faces of Wollstonecraft, 
her claim that women have reason, and the passion in her 
life and writing. As Duran points out, these two are not 
incompatible, and Wollstonecraft addresses the unity of 
reason and passion in the life of a woman. This can be 
seen by taking her work as a whole, paying attention to 
her fiction, and her writings on religion and metaphysics. 
Duran particularly emphasizes Wollstonecraft’s awareness 
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4. Submission deadlines: Submissions for spring issues 
are due by the preceding November 1; submissions for fall 
issues are due by the preceding April.
NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE 
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
DIVERSITY CONFERENCE
The next Diversity Conference will be held May 28 to 
May 30, 2015, at Villanova University, in conjunction 
with the Hypatia conference. The call for proposals can 
be found at http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/artsci/
hypatiaconference/ and the deadline for submissions is 
January 15. Additional features of the conference include 
professional workshops on publishing feminist philosophy, 
a workshop on sexual harassment and bystander training, 
the APA Diversity Summit (May 29), and the APA/CSW site 
visit training workshop (May 31). Modest travel grants are 
available for presenters who could not otherwise attend. 
Many thanks to those of you who gave so generously to 
make the conference and training programs possible.
SITE VISIT PROGRAM
Three site visits were conducted in the 2013-2014 academic 
year and three more are scheduled for the fall of 2014. 
Most visits were or will be to philosophy departments with 
Ph.D. programs, and one is at a small liberal arts college 
with no graduate programs.
CSW WEBSITE
The CSW website (http://www.apaonlinecsw.org/) continues 
to feature bimonthly profiles of women philosophers. 
Links to excellent resources include one to a database on 
teaching with articles and readings, another to the crowd-
sourced directory of women philosophers, and one to the 
APA ombudsperson for nondiscrimination, who will receive 
complaints of discrimination and, where possible, serve as 
a resource to APA members regarding such complaints.
TASK FORCE ON INCLUSIVENESS
The APA executive committee has formed a new task force 
on inclusiveness to provide top-down help for diversity 
initiatives. Chaired by Elizabeth Anderson, its members 
are Lawrence Blum, Susanna Nuccitelli, Ronald Sundstrom, 
Kenneth Taylor, Robin Zhang, and Peggy DesAutels. 
Anyone who has recommendations concerning the status 
of women should give them to Peggy DesAutels, who will 
pass them on. The task force is expected to issue a report 
by November 2014.
CSW SESSIONS AT APA MEETINGS
The CSW-sponsored sessions at the three APA meetings 
held in 2013-2014 were well attended and well received. 
Eastern Division: Men Behaving Splendidly—Why and How 
to Organize a Gender-Balanced Conference
Chair: Kathryn Norlock (Trent University) 
Speakers: Kathryn Norlock (Trent University)
John Protevi (Louisiana State University) 
that the ability of a person to unify reason and passion 
depends in part on the structure of the society in which she 
finds herself, and in her own situation within that society. 
This is a thought-provoking essay, especially for those of 
us who include Wollstonecraft’s works in our courses or 
scholarship.
ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON 
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 
The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored 
by the APA committee on the status of women (CSW). The 
newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent 
philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None 
of the varied philosophical views presented by authors 
of newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any 
or all of the members of the committee on the status of 
women, including the editor(s) of the newsletter, nor does 
the committee advocate any particular type of feminist 
philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical 
attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of 
gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration. 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND 
INFORMATION 
1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish 
information about the status of women in philosophy 
and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more 
widely available. The newsletter contains discussions of 
recent developments in feminist philosophy and related 
work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book 
reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the 
traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on 
feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about 
the work of the APA committee on the status of women. 
Articles submitted to the newsletter should be limited to 
approximately ten double-spaced pages and must follow 
the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please 
submit essays electronically to the editor. All manuscripts 
should be prepared for anonymous review. References 
should follow The Chicago Manual of Style. 
2. Book reviews and reviewers: If you have published a 
book that is appropriate for review in the newsletter, please 
have your publisher send us a copy of your book. We are 
always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer to review 
books (or some particular book), please send the editor a 
CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of 
research and teaching. 
3. Where to send things: Please send all articles, comments, 
suggestions, books, and other communications to the 
editor, Dr. Margaret Crouch, at mcrouch@emich.edu.
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mindful of the ways cognitive-affective classroom dynamics 
influence how we navigate the course content.2
DOES THIS  HAPPEN WHEN YOU TEACH?
DeEndré walks into class and sits in his usual seat in the 
far back row. We are discussing Claudia Card’s “Rape as 
a Terrorist Institution.” He busily searches the web for 
statistics on sexual assault and domestic violence against 
men. He finds one, raises his hand, and says, “Men are 
victims too, according to a recent statistic from Center for 
Disease Control and U.S. Department of Justice, more men 
than women are victims of intimate partner violence. It’s 
over 40 percent!”3 Armed with this new statistic, he asserts 
that our discussion would be less biased if we focused 
more generally on intimate partner violence. DeEndré 
makes these de-gendering moves with such regularity that 
women in the class cringe and audibly sigh when he raises 
his hand.
The class is reading articles on privilege including Andrea 
Smith’s critique of the privilege literature. Bethany, a 
white woman, tells the class that she does not want to 
read “propaganda.” She insists that people of color have 
privileges too because “they can get affirmative action 
benefits and NAACP scholarships.” She tells a story about 
the time she applied for a manager’s position at a local 
restaurant, but “a Mexican took her job.” A few white 
students nod in agreement. Some Latina/o and Black 
students become visibly agitated.
Our feminist epistemology class has read Frantz Fanon 
and we are discussing racialized embodiment. James, an 
African American student who is taking his first philosophy 
class, shares an experience about what it’s like for him to 
move through the world in a Black male body. Raymond, a 
young white (and kind of nerdy) philosophy student, listens 
to James and then wonders aloud whether there might be 
a possible world in which Black bodies are not regarded 
with suspicion. He believes Black men are regarded with 
suspicion, but he thinks “the hypothetical question is more 
philosophical and thus more interesting.” He wants to use 
possible world semantics as an objection to Fanon.
We are discussing the persistence of racism. Jennifer, a 
white philosophy student, offers as evidence some racist 
graffiti she saw recently in a dormitory bathroom. She tells 
the class that the graffiti said “N----- go back to Chicago!” 
She animates her description with that little two-fingered 
scare quotes gesture. I pause our discussion and address 
her use of the N-word, and ask her to consider that the 
word might mean something different coming out of white 
mouths. She responds with an appeal to the “use-mention 
distinction,” and explains that because this is a foundational 
concept in analytic philosophy that it’s perfectly acceptable 
to “mention,” but not “use” the N-word.
WHAT IS EPISTEMIC PUSHBACK?
Feminist philosophers and critical race theorists will be 
intimately familiar with the kinds of epistemic resistance 
these examples illustrate.4 Perhaps your own stories spring 
to mind as you read them. What I am calling epistemic 
pushback is an expression of epistemic resistance that 
happens regularly in discussions that touch our core 
Matthew Smith (University of Leeds)
Jason Stanley (Yale University)
Central Division: Attracting Women Philosophy Majors
Speakers: Morgan Thompson (University of Pittsburgh)
Toni Adelberg (University of California–San Diego)
Najah Magliore (Colby College)
Pacific Division: APA/CSW Site Visit Program
Speakers: Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)
Carla Fehr (University of Waterloo)
Joseph Rouse (Wesleyan University)
ARTICLES
Navigating Epistemic Pushback in 
Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy 
Classes
Alison Bailey 
ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
Racism is especially rampant in places and people 
that produce knowledge.1
- Gloria Anzaldúa
There are days when I envy my colleagues who teach a 
standard western philosophy curriculum. Students do not 
show up to their office hours in tears because they have 
realized the shortcomings of substance dualism. And I’m 
fairly certain that they never think about how to manage 
the class if the Gettier problem triggers discomfort and 
anger. When an audible episode of student resistance 
occurs in their classrooms, it is usually about grading 
practices, workload, a comment made in class, or a general 
frustration with the opacity of the readings or lectures. 
With the possible exception of discussions about God’s 
existence, most traditional puzzles do not implicate the 
self in the deeply emotional ways that courses in feminist 
and critical race philosophy do. It is no wonder students 
respond by holding their ground.
I want to work with, not against, this ground-holding reflex 
by offering a strategy for navigating it productively. My focus 
is on undergraduate feminist and critical race philosophy 
classes that have a strong applied intersectional content. 
I use four examples of the resistance I have in mind as a 
point of departure. I suggest that these ground-holding 
responses cannot be reduced to a healthy skepticism. 
In addition, I argue that both critical thinking and “safe 
spaces” pedagogies are not entirely an effective way to 
navigate resistance. The pushback in these classrooms 
is very specific and our pedagogies should reflect that. I 
recommend treating epistemic pushback as a “shadow” 
text and encourage students to collectively navigate these 
texts alongside the assigned readings. I conclude with 
a concrete suggestion for helping students to become 
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from the project of exploring the lived bodily dimensions 
of oppression. When Jennifer justifies her deployment of 
the N-word with an appeal to the use/mention distinction, 
she privileges philosophical conventions over the safety of 
students of color in our class.
Epistemic pushback cannot be attributed to the healthy 
skeptical stances that philosophers are encouraged to 
adopt as part of our disciplinary best practices. As Phyllis 
Rooney notes, “the ‘default skeptical stance’ that many 
philosophers regularly adopt can (among other things) be 
epistemically problematic, particularly when it is likely to 
discourage or misrepresent the views of those who belong 
to minority subgroups within the discipline—not least when 
they seek to examine ‘new’ topics of particular significance 
for their subgroup (topics of race or feminist philosophy for 
example).”7 When skepticism becomes the default stance 
in discussions on gender, race, and their intersections it can 
discourage, silence, depress, frustrate and anger members 
of marginalized groups. When skepticism is falsely equated 
with knee-jerk doubt, it becomes especially difficult to 
engage.
Unlike healthy forms of skepticism that move conversations 
forward by encouraging open-minded and curious 
doubting, epistemic pushback is driven by psychological 
defense mechanisms, what José Medina identifies as 
the need for “cognitive self protection.”8 I don’t want to 
silence this resistance. I want students to understand 
the difference between resistance that is beneficial to 
knowledge production, and resistance that serves as an 
obstacle to knowledge production. As Medina suggests:
[r]esistances can be a good and a bad thing, 
epistemically speaking. The resistances of your 
cognitive life keep you grounded. As Wittgenstein 
would put it, in order to have a real (and not simply 
a delusional) cognitive life, “we need friction,” we 
need to go “back to the rough ground.” But there 
are also resistances that function as obstacles, as 
weights that slow us down or preclude us from 
following (or even having access to) certain paths 
or pursuing further certain questions, problems, 
curiosities.9
Epistemic resistance is beneficial when it works to establish 
a toehold, to gain ground, and to move discussions 
forward. In Medina’s words, there is a beneficial epistemic 
friction, that prompts us “to be self critical, to compare 
and contrast [our] beliefs, to meet justificatory demands, 
to recognize cognitive gaps, and so on.”10 What I’m calling 
episodes of epistemic pushback “function as obstacles, as 
weights that slow us down or preclude us from following 
(or having access to) certain paths or pursuing further 
certain questions, problems and curiosities.”11 Epistemic 
resistance offers no epistemic friction. It keeps our 
affective-cognitive wheels spinning in place by censoring, 
distracting, dodging, silencing, or “inhibiting the formation 
of beliefs, the articulation of doubts, the formulation of 
questions and lines of inquiry, and so on.”12
HOW CAN WE NAVIGATE EPISTEMIC PUSHBACK?
It has taken me more than a few years to understand 
beliefs about the world and how that worldview shapes 
the understandings we have of ourselves. These responses 
are not limited to academic classrooms; one hears them 
everywhere, but I focus on philosophy classrooms because 
this is where I spend most of my time engaging them.
Epistemic pushback broadly characterizes a family of 
cognitive, affective, and verbal tactics that are deployed 
regularly to dodge the challenging and exhausting chore of 
engaging topics and questions that scare us. These topics 
are unsettling because they directly call into question our 
sense of self. No one likes to consider the possibility that 
they might be part of the problem, that they might be 
complicit in fortifying social structures that re-inscribe racist 
and [hetero]sexist practices. We like to think of ourselves 
as good people, so when discussions of injustice challenge 
our goodness we push back.5 What Alice MacIntyre calls 
“white talk” is a classic example of epistemic pushback. 
As McIntyre explains, white talk is a predictable set of 
discursive patterns that white folks habitually deploy 
when asked directly about the connections between white 
privilege and institutional racism that serves to insulate 
and excuse white people “from the difficult and almost 
paralyzing task of engaging [our] own whiteness.”6 White 
talk signals a tactical refusal to understand, characterized 
by a general unwillingness to consider and engage ideas 
that directly challenge our sense of identity, and the 
worldview that gives our identity weight and substance. 
It has deeply affective roots around which our cognitive 
habits defensively wrap themselves.
Bethany’s characterization of the white privilege literature 
as propaganda marks a fearful refusal to consider her role 
in the maintenance of everyday racism. Her discomfort is 
expressed by her attempt to re-direct our attention back 
to her experiences with so-called “reverse discrimination,” 
back to her belief that the principles of meritocracy have 
been violated. DeEndré does not want to think about the 
ways rape culture contributes to sexual violence against 
girls and women, so he re-focuses the discussion on 
violence against men, then advocates for a more general 
discussion on intimate partner violence. Here resistance 
is deployed to derail conversations, interrupt or dismiss 
testimony and counterarguments, or to facilitate retreats 
into silence. Fear, vulnerability, and anxiety drive these 
conversational detours, dismissals, and denials. Each offers 
a means of pre-emptively deploying disbelief in ways 
that allow would-be knowers to reject an uncomfortable 
position without seriously listening to, hearing, and making 
a sincere effort to understand that position.
The next two examples are subtle. I ask readers to keep them 
in mind because they happen with predictable regularity. 
Raymond and Jennifer’s epistemic engagements may 
count as sincere efforts to apply philosophical concepts 
from other classes to the material in our class. But I wonder 
whether these efforts might also be a subtle way of pressing 
philosophical concepts into the service of a broader 
tactical refusal to understand. When Raymond steers the 
discussion to the safety of possible world semantics he 
refuses to hear James’s testimony. He is more comfortable 
addressing injustices in the abstract. His appeal to possible 
worlds is neither appropriate nor useful here: it distracts 
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the resistance students offer before thinking critically. 
Navigating epistemic pushback is frustrating, annoying, 
and time consuming. I treat it seriously because I’ve come 
to understand it as social practice that contributes to the 
active production and maintenance of ignorance. 
Good teaching should not only track the production of 
knowledge but also the production of ignorance. As 
Nancy Tuana explains, “if we are to fully understand the 
complex practices of knowledge production and the 
variety of factors that account for why something is known, 
we must also understand the practices that account for 
not knowing; that is, for our lack of knowledge about a 
phenomenon.”15 A central premise in the literature on 
epistemologies of ignorance is that ignorance is not a 
simple gap in knowledge: It is an active social production. 
My examples point to a deeply seated and active resistance 
to knowing, which is carefully choreographed and skillfully 
maintained though discursive tactics, body language, and 
countless other habitual acts of omission and negligence. 
To persist willful ignorance requires daily management. 
Its uninterrupted repetition is required for speakers to 
keep habitual detours, dismissals, and denials in good 
working order.16 If epistemic pushback tactically maintains 
ignorance, and if this form of epistemic exchange regularly 
circulates in feminist philosophy classrooms, then we need 
a strategy for navigating resistance that is productive. How 
should we do this?
TRACKING IGNORANCE: TREATING EPISTEMIC 
PUSHBACK AS “SHADOW TEXT”
Willful ignorance circulates in even the most progressive 
classroom spaces. No classroom can be fully ignorance 
free, but we can work toward making these spaces 
“ignorance mindful.” To this end I’m recommending that 
feminist classrooms work towards becoming collectively 
mindful of epistemic pushback and use any detected 
points of resistance as opportunities to reveal the ways 
we are all prone to embracing ignorance in the interests of 
dodging discomfort. I work with students to cultivate this 
mindfulness by making epistemic pushback visible and 
treating it as a “shadow text.”
I use the term “shadow text” metaphorically to point to the 
unwritten, and sometimes unspoken, content of epistemic 
pushback. DeEndré’s claim that “Men are victims too!” 
is a shadow text. His response shadows the readings in 
the same way that a detective shadows a suspect whom 
he considers to be suspicious. Bethany’s insistence that 
“affirmative action benefits count as privileges” is also 
shadow text. Her remarks run alongside of the claims about 
privilege as unearned advantage that should be a basic 
human entitlement. They punctuate the course content 
with a stubborn refusal to understand. If Jennifer and 
Raymond continue to press philosophical concepts into 
the service of a broader tactical refusal to understand, and 
if the concepts they introduce offer no epistemic friction, 
then we should also treat these moves as shadow texts.
My use of “shadow” is intended to call to mind the image 
of something walking closely along side another thing. I 
picture an informal unwritten utterance or bodily gesture 
that epistemic pushback cannot be navigated exclusively 
using academic philosophy’s critical thinking toolkit. 
I’ve lost entire class sessions trying to engage pushback 
argumentatively only to realize that adversarial formats fuel 
this resistance. Critical thinking solutions treat epistemic 
pushback as a failure to argue well. But these are affective 
as well as cognitive responses; as such they are stubborn, 
deep, volatile, unmoving, and practically immune from 
argument-focused pedagogies. No amount of argument 
analysis, informal fallacy review, or appeals to the principle 
of charity can defuse this pushback. These topics push 
buttons; they prompt feelings of fear, guilt, shame, anger, 
and vulnerability, and this is where we should begin.
If the pushback is more affective than cognitive, then 
maybe creating safe spaces can address resistance at the 
source. I’ve tried integrating pedagogies from anti-racism 
workshops, SafeZone trainings, and community diversity 
summits into my philosophy classes. Once I spent an 
entire class session collectively crafting a “Contract for a 
Liberated Space” that listed guidelines for productive, 
compassionate, and respectful discussions. The contract 
helped focus our discussion. It also gave students 
permission to step in, educate, correct, or call one another 
out on bad behavior, but it did not create the desired 
“safe space.” Safe spaces have normative goals: They are 
typically characterized as places where “participants can 
be relaxed and express ourselves freely without fear of 
being made to feel uncomfortable, unsafe, unwelcome, 
or marginalized.”13 Accounts of safety that privilege free 
expression and comfort over listening and being heard are 
problematic from the start. I first realized this when two 
students repeatedly ignored a sexual assault survivor’s 
testimony and, under the banner of “freedom to speak,” 
deployed rape myths and “men too” reasoning to dodge 
questions about their complicity in rape culture. Sexual 
assault survivors are not safe in spaces where freedom 
of expression is not balanced equally with responsible 
and compassionate listening. This makes sense: we feel 
most safe and comfortable when our fears, unease, and 
anger are engaged and heard. Listening and hearing each 
requires a shift in our attitude toward risk. Risk taking 
by definition involves recognizing that taking chances 
makes everyone vulnerable: a student’s contributions to 
a discussion can evoke anger, laughter, tears, joy, rage, a 
smile of recognition, eye rolling, fist pounding, a request 
for clarification, empathy, or pleas for patience. Safety is 
an unstable, slippery, and relatively context dependent. 
Identities are intersectional and topics that feel safe, 
interesting, and empowering for some students will be 
grueling, difficult, and annoying for others.14 So, there 
are no pure safe spaces. We can only work with what we 
offer one another. I want us to go into these conversations 
together knowing this.
EPISTEMIC PUSHBACK AS AN EXPRESSION OF 
WILLFUL IGNORANCE
Teaching feminist and critical race philosophy requires 
a distinctly nuanced pedagogy: one that begins with 
a mindfulness of how cognitive-affective resistance 
functions and then moves to a deeper understanding of 
the arguments. We must learn to identify and navigate 
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What is this response to the question doing? Where does 
it take the conversation and why?), and (3) speculate what 
might have driven this answer. The point of this exercise is 
to make visible the tension between the question and the 
reply, and to speculate about what triggers this discursive 
move. I try to keep the conversation short. I have them 
do the exercise for the next two or three instances of 
epistemic pushback before I introduce them to the idea 
of shadow texts. My hope is that they will begin to identify 
shadow texts on their own. At some point I ask them to 
think about how naming shadow texts might help us to 
track the production of ignorance. This requires some work. 
Students will almost always understand ignorance to mean 
that the speaker is saying something stupid. It’s essential 
for them to understand that tracking ignorance requires our 
attentions to be focused not on a few problem individuals, 
but learning to see epistemic pushback and to tie these 
ignorance producing tactics to a more general refusal to 
know. In short, I want us to focus on what’s happening, and 
not who is making it happen.
Framing epistemic pushback as a shadow text is 
pedagogically useful for a number of reasons. First, naming 
pushback turns these epistemic exchanges into teachable 
moments. I’ve had some success with helping students 
to understand that resistance is not reducible to just bad 
behavior or obnoxious interruptions. There is something 
more deep and complicated going on here and it’s worth 
exploring this resistance alongside of the readings. Next, 
acknowledging resistance as a text to be engaged, rather 
than as an interruption to be managed can help to diffuse 
the anger or fear. When a resister’s concerns are engaged 
respectfully she or he will feel heard and will hopefully 
listen more carefully. Using shadow texts to navigate 
epistemic pushback can also serve as a productive point 
of entry into larger discussions about the social production 
of ignorance. Shadow texts may not initially offer the 
beneficial epistemic friction Medina finds necessary for 
positive epistemic resistance, but if navigated in the ways 
I’ve recommended they can help to steer classes onto a 
more active discursive terrain.
NOTES
1. Gloria Anzaldúa, Haciendo Caras: Una Entrada. Making Face, 
Making Soul/Haciendo Caras: Creative and Critical Perspectives 
of Women of Color, xix.
2. I want to recognize that my identity as an able-bodied, straight, 
white, cisgendered, middle-aged woman has a huge impact 
on the classroom dynamic, the kind of “push back” I get from 
students, and ultimately the strategies available to me. My 
observations and suggestions are not offered as a one-size-fits-
all pedagogy for addressing epistemic pushback in academic 
environments.
3. Bert H. Hoff, “National Study: More Men than Women Victims of 
Intimate Partner Violence, Psychological Aggression.”
4. José Medina’s The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and 
Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice and Resistant Imaginations 
(2013) has enriched the nuanced political and epistemological 
implications of what is now called “the epistemology of 
resistance.” I am very inspired by his account, the conceptual 
vocabulary he crafts, and the vision he offers. However, I don’t 
want to simply adopt his terminology wholesale and apply it to 
classroom pedagogies at this point. So, I bring it in where helps 
to ground the pedagogy. I use “epistemic pushback” to point 
specifically to one species of epistemic resistance. Medina would 
categorize this as either internal or external negative epistemic 
resistance. See Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance, 49-50.
moving alongside of a more formal written one. Shadow 
texts can certainly be thought of as reactions to course 
content, but I’d prefer to understand them as “being called 
up by” the course content. There are reasons why DeEndré 
and Jennifer “go there”; their reactions are not knee jerk. 
Shadow texts spring from these deeply affective-cognitive 
spaces. I want to superimpose a second meaning on this 
account of shadow texts. Shadows are more commonly 
understood as the products of obstacles; that is, as dark 
areas or shapes produced by bodies (obstacles) coming 
between a light source and a surface. Recall Medina’s claim 
that epistemic resistance can “function as an obstacle, as 
weights that slow us down or preclude us from following (or 
having access to) certain paths or pursuing further certain 
questions, problems and curiosities.”17 When epistemic 
pushback functions in this way, it casts a shadow text. Here, 
shadows are regions of epistemic opacity. The discursive 
detours and distractions signal epistemic closure; they 
tell listeners “I’m not going there.” I’ve coined the term 
“shadow texts” to focus students’ attention on this double 
meaning.
Treating epistemic pushback as a shadow text doesn’t always 
offer us the beneficial epistemic friction that knowledge 
production demands. This, however, doesn’t mean that 
shadow texts can’t be navigated in pedagogically useful 
ways. Shadow texts may be obstacles, but they are not 
immoveable barriers. I prefer to think of them as “sticking 
points,” preludes to epistemic friction if you will. Epistemic 
sticking points don’t always give us the necessary friction 
we need to move a conversation forward, but they can 
be used to create a toehold that serves as a useful point 
of departure for future difficult conversations, even if the 
speaker remains unconvinced in the end.
NAVIGATING SHADOW TEXTS
I have a section on our syllabus that defines and describes 
shadow texts. I introduce students to this concept on the 
first day of class, but we don’t begin to navigate shadow 
texts until there is a clear moment of epistemic pushback. 
Shadow texts must be engaged carefully. DeEndré and 
Bethany’s concerns must be navigated in ways that do not 
re-center maleness and whiteness. Jennifer and Raymond’s 
concerns must be navigated in ways that point to my 
concerns about whether these concepts have epistemic 
friction.
At the first moment of epistemic pushback, I ask the class 
if we can pause to consider what happened. For example, 
suppose I’ve asked the question, “What does Card mean 
when she claims that ‘rape is a terrorist institution’?” I write 
this question on the board. A few students usually respond 
by defining terrorism and explaining how the definition 
helps us to understand rape culture. I write the responses 
on the board, including DeEndré’s response. My concern 
is not whether he has answered the question (he hasn’t). I 
want to know why his answer “went there” and not to Card’s 
definition, and I want to know what is driving this move.
I invite the class to consider the question and the responses 
that I’ve put on the board. The class then does a free-writing 
exercise where they (1) identify the resistant response, (2) 
explain how this response differs from the others (e.g., 
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Yancy, George. “Loving Wisdom and the Effort to Make Philosophy 
‘Unsafe.’” Epistemologies Humanities Journal (2011).
Uses of Multimedia Representations 
in Undergraduate Feminist Philosophy 
Courses
Crista Lebens
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–WHITEWATER
Philosophy is a discipline that seemingly requires few 
visual aids, but we live in a visually oriented culture. In 
discussions of gender and race construction, visuals 
are crucial. How can abstract philosophical concepts, 
especially about gender and race, be illustrated visually? 
In this essay, I discuss a project in which I collaborated 
with two undergraduate students on the development of 
multimedia learning objects (short videos and PowerPoint 
presentations). I currently use these digital learning objects 
(LOs) in my Philosophy of Gender & Race and Feminist 
Philosophy courses. These LOs incorporate current events 
and contemporary aesthetics to bring abstract concepts to 
life. Though their contribution is significant, almost more 
important than the product was the process. Despite the 
fact that I was the instructor, we all learned from each 
other in some respect. The process was transformative 
for all of us. In this essay, I will describe the process of 
constructing these LOs. Whether or not producing this type 
of material interests the reader, the process of engaging 
undergraduate students in any sort of collaborative work 
offers a rich and rewarding experience far beyond the 
contribution the product makes in the classroom.
First, some background: I work at the University of 
Wisconsin–Whitewater, a regional university in the 
Wisconsin State University system with a 4-4 teaching 
load; teaching takes up the bulk of my working life. As 
I began developing a new course on race and gender, I 
looked for funding opportunities to support the production 
of teaching materials. I had explored digital repositories 
such as Merlot, and searched YouTube videos and other 
online resources. While there is a substantial body of work 
online that illustrates standard (non feminist) philosophical 
concepts and texts, I did not find materials that directly 
addressed the concepts or the texts I use in my courses. I 
decided to create my own.
The grants officer at my university suggested I consider 
collaborating with undergraduates (NB: we do not have 
grad programs in my department or in women’s studies). 
The motivation for this project, creating short videos to 
illustrate complex concepts, came from my belief that using 
visuals to convey concepts of gender and race construction 
would strengthen a course on gender and race. The 
process was successful in terms of engaging students in 
the course and building strong mentoring relationships 
with the student collaborators. As a result, I applied for and 
received a second grant to develop videos for my feminist 
philosophy class.
5. For a complete discussion of complicity and goodness, see 
Barbara Applebaum’s Being White, Being Good: White Complicity, 
Moral Responsibility, and Social Justice Pedagogy.
6. Alice McIntyre, Making Meaning of Whiteness: Exploring Racial 
Identities with White Teachers, 46. White talk includes the 
following sorts of utterances: “My ancestors never owned slaves. 
I’m not like my bigoted father. I don’t care if you’re Black, red, or 
yellow with polka dots, everyone should be treated equally.”
7. Phyllis Rooney, “An Ambivalent Ally: On Philosophical 
Argumentation and Diversity,” 36-37.
8. José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance, 35.
9. Ibid., 48.
10. Ibid., 50.
11. Ibid., 8.
12. Ibid., 50.
13. See Laura Freedman, “Creating Safe Spaces: Strategies for 
Confronting Implicit and Explicit Bias and Stereotype Threat in 
the Classroom.” This exact language also appears regularly 
in Internet searches for safe spaces, usually in the context of 
mission statements for LGBTQA resource centers.
14. George Yancy advocates for the creation of “unsafe spaces” 
that involve marking whiteness, maleness, and other privileged 
identities, making it visible, rendering it strange, or decentering 
it. Creating unsafe spaces should not be mistakenly equated 
with fomenting hostile situations; instead, the goal is to tackle 
privilege and power by inviting members of privileged groups 
to become uncomfortable with their power. I share his concerns 
about the focus on making classrooms safe. See his “Loving 
Wisdom and the Effort to Make Philosophy ‘Unsafe.”
15. Nancy Tuana, “The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women’s Health 
Movement and Epistemologies of Ignorance,” 9-10.
16. For example, see Elizabeth Spelman’s “Managing Ignorance” in 
Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, eds. Shannon Sullivan 
and Nancy Tuana.
17. Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance, 48.
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From my end it appeared to be helpful for them to have 
each other to consult. We met face to face regularly and 
online quite frequently as well, which helped because we 
all lived significant distances from campus. Amy was not 
available for the second project, but Nik and I collaborated 
a great deal online via Gmail chat and Google docs.
RESULTS
I have made examples of digital learning objects available 
on my blog. We produced seventeen learning objects in 
total (between the two projects), including short films (up 
to eleven minutes), and PowerPoint presentations with 
embedded multimedia. In addition to exploring Lugones’s 
Logic of Purity/Logic of Curdling, we covered a range of 
topics, for example, the following:
Video: Sonia Sotomayor: Standing before the law 
• Purpose: introduce the course’s emphasis on 
conceptualizing race and gender simultaneously
• Introduce the idea of the social contract
• Chronology: shown the first day of class
• Key ideas: social contract; multiple enmeshed 
oppressions
Video: “Post Racial” America
• Purpose: show real-life examples of how the social 
contract fails. Supplement readings by Carole 
Pateman and Charles Mills
• Chronology: shown about four weeks into the course
• Key ideas: social contract; racial contract
Video: Mold, Immobilize, Reduce 
As a product of the second collaboration, this video shows 
a more sophisticated aesthetic.
• Purpose: highlight key concepts found in two 
theories of oppression: Marilyn Frye, Iris Marion 
Young
• Create a historical context for theories of 
oppression
• Situate theories of oppression in relation to 
multiple axes of oppression
OUR PROCESS
One thesis presented throughout the Gender and Race 
course is that the social contract does not work for everyone 
in the United States. That requires some discussion of 
the concept itself, as well as introducing concepts such 
as classical liberalism and radical critiques of liberalism. 
Texts that serve these purposes include Carole Pateman’s 
and Charles Mills’s analysis and criticisms of the social 
contract, as well as selections on the social contract from 
the anthology Hip Hop and Philosophy.
I chose two students with whom I was familiar. Nik and 
Amy had taken two courses with me previously, namely, 
Feminist Philosophy and Lesbian Studies, and had been 
especially interested in my area of specialty, the work 
of María Lugones, which we had studied in both classes. 
Furthermore, I knew Nik had both the technical skills to 
create videos and the interest in the subject matter. In the 
Lesbian Studies course, I had offered the class the option of 
producing a multimedia presentation as an alternative to the 
standard essay exam covering material for that segment of 
the course. This alternative was not an easy out; the project 
had to engage the ideas in a meaningful way. Nik is a gifted 
digital media artist, and she produced an outstanding 
multimedia presentation. Amy is a skilled writer and thinker. 
She and Nik were interested in collaborating on this project. 
In short, we were in the right place at the right time. It is 
not surprising that this collaboration came out of a series of 
women’s studies classes they took with me. In those classes 
it was clear that they found Lugones’s work as engaging as 
I have. The process of working together was an exercise in 
feminist practice. We came from multiplicitous backgrounds 
and journeys, navigating differences of age, institutional 
power, class, race, and gender identity, and we shared 
commonalities of lesbian and/or queer identities, as well as 
a politics of resistance to multiple enmeshed oppressions. 
Without these political commitments, the project would 
not have been successful. For a project like this, one has to 
know and love the work to be able to teach it to others.
The first project took the three of us most of a summer to 
produce.
My tasks:
• Choose the readings I want to emphasize 
• Identify key concepts or issues to illustrate 
• Write overviews of what I want covered 
• Be available as a resource
• Stick to the timeline
Students’ tasks:
• Read the material from which these concepts were 
drawn
• Note: This took a few weeks of preparation and 
discussion. It was really exciting to discuss the 
ideas and work out what concepts to illustrate 
and how to do it visually. 
• Collaborate on parts of the writing and presentation 
• Nik: choose the images or film clips and music and 
compose the videos 
• Keep in contact; ask questions to clarify difficult 
concepts
• Stick to the timeline
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primary choices of images. Aesthetically, Nik favors 
archival images, and made frequent use of copyright-free 
images from 1950s-era American movies. In the case of 
the oppression video, she chose images of white women, 
eschewing images of women of color from movies of that 
era because she found the depictions to be problematic. 
Even though the images of white women depicted them in 
objectifying situations, the narrative of the video serves to 
challenge that. As a team, we agreed that it would be more 
difficult to undercut the sexist, racist stereotypes conveyed 
by images of women of color. Rather than risk reinforcing 
these stereotypes for my (primarily white) audience, we 
avoided them. The analysis that supports this choice added 
a layer to my understanding of historical racism and sexism. 
Pedagogically, I use this as a teachable moment. When I 
show the video in class, I explain the reasoning behind this 
choice, prompting students to notice the presence of the 
absence (of strong images of women of color) and consider 
why that is.
Finally, I learned from working with Nik and Amy how to 
be a better teacher. We shared a love of the intellectual 
work we were doing together. We worked together to solve 
creative problems in illustrating the concepts, and through 
that experience, as I saw their commitment to the work, my 
commitment to keep connecting with students renewed. 
In short, the experience has kept me from “burning out” 
as a teacher. I will always know that there are students 
who really care about these ideas, and for whom these 
ideas make a significant difference in their lives. That is 
sustaining.
The experience was also one of feminist practice. Clearly 
we worked within an asymmetrical power structure; I had 
been their instructor and would be again, and I was their 
supervisor and director of the project. At the same time, 
I trusted their decisions and their authority as knowers, 
and reinforced their sense of themselves as “authoritative 
female interlocutors” as described by the Milan Woman’s 
Book Collective. With my guidance, they wrote sections 
of text and shaped the messages of the videos. Second, I 
think it was helpful overall for them to work together on the 
project, insofar as they had a partner with whom they could 
test ideas. For students who might be less forthcoming in 
an academic environment, working with another student 
can make the interpersonal dynamics a bit less intense 
than working solo with an instructor. 
PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
The students were paid a stipend of $750. To alleviate 
payroll complications, I scheduled flat-rate payments over 
the course of the work period. I encouraged them to stay 
within the time budgeted, but, as is often the case, they 
exceeded that time. The books and other materials, such 
as software and DVDs, purchased to produce the learning 
objects belonged to them after the project. Though 
they received no direct academic credit for their work, 
both Nik and Amy referenced this project in successful 
job applications. Second, we presented our work at a 
statewide Women’s Studies Consortium and at a Midwest 
Society for Women in Philosophy meeting. Finally, to 
date, our collaboration has led to Nik’s presentation 
of an original video at a Midwest Society for Women in 
To illustrate both the social contract and the criticisms, 
we chose the example of the confirmation hearings for 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The hearings were 
taking place at the same time as we were working on the 
project, so there was much interest and discussion of them. 
We chose this example for several reasons; first, we wanted 
to use a current event. Even though the example is now 
five years old, race and gender dynamics have not changed 
significantly in such a short time. The confirmation of a 
Supreme Court justice has lasting significance. Second, I 
specifically wanted an example that incorporated both race 
and gender dynamics. As the record shows, Sotomayor 
was questioned on her racial politics and asked if she 
has “an anger problem,” a question that has gendered 
and raced implications. I chose this example over another 
event widely discussed at the time, namely, the arrest of 
Professor Henry Louis Gates as he tried to enter his home, 
the criticism of the arresting officer, and the ensuing “beer 
summit.” While that series of events, too, has gendered and 
raced implications, from the stereotype of the Black Man to 
the rapprochement over a few beers, I wanted the images 
and analysis in this LO to highlight a woman, particularly 
a woman of color. A “Beer Summit” video would reinforce 
the absence of images of women of color, especially 
ones that depict them in positions of power. Second, the 
Beer Summit example would reinscribe racial dynamics as 
strictly a “black-white thing.” I wanted to begin the series 
by presenting images highlighting the marginalization/
othering of race and gender simultaneously and that depict 
race outside of the black/white binary. The Sotomayor 
example served these purposes well, and functioned to set 
a visual and conceptual framework for the course.
The video has already received critical responses. For 
example, Marilyn Frye expressed the concern that ultimately 
the video reinforces the idea of the social contract, given 
the inclusion of footage from Judge Sotomayor’s swearing-
in ceremony.1 While it may reinforce the myth that the 
“system” basically works, albeit with a few unfortunate 
bumps for some individuals, in class discussion I emphasize 
the fact that the barriers exist at all, in the form of the 
questions she was asked, demonstrating that not all stand 
“equal before the law.”
A second response, from Mariana Ortega, elicited 
provocative questions to take up in class discussion and 
beyond:
And it is in these examples such as Judge 
Sotomayor being questioned that I see [whiteness 
as impartiality] . . . being more explicit—whiteness 
as gatekeeping with the pretense that it is not 
gatekeeping but justice and neutrality. Sad.2 
Judge Sotomayor must make the case that she is impartial 
in a way that was not required of her white and male 
colleagues. “Whiteness” is the mark of impartiality. In 
Lugones’s terms, Judge Sotomayor must split-separate 
herself from her Latina identity, yet retain it.
A second example of an aesthetic and political choice 
we made concerns the images in the “Mold, Immobilize, 
Reduce,” video on oppression. There Nik made the 
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enormously rewarding experience. The project and the 
process together demonstrated feminist practice deeply 
informed by the philosophical concepts we worked to 
illustrate.
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Academic Pressures and Feminist 
Solutions: Teaching Ethics against the 
Grain
Kate Parsons
WEBSTER UNIVERSITY
Margaret Crouch begins her important article “Implicit Bias 
and Gender (and Other Sorts of) Diversity in Philosophy and 
the Academy in the Context of the Corporatized University” 
(2012) with the insight that two things that she values most—
the movement toward increased diversity in philosophy 
and the existence of our discipline in higher education—
are both under fire by the same threat: neoliberal1 thinking 
and practices. I would like to add another dimension to her 
compelling claims, and suggest that these threats become 
especially potent, and particularly hard to navigate, in 
Philosophy conference and sale of the video screening 
rights to another university.
STUDENT RESPONSES
At the end of the initial offering of the Philosophy of 
Gender and Race course, I asked students to comment on 
the learning objects using the standard evaluation form. 
The consensus among the students was positive. One 
student in that class went on to present original work at a 
professional conference. I certainly cannot give sole credit 
to the learning objects, but the LOs project demonstrated 
to my students that they could produce work outside of 
course assignments and gain professional recognition for 
it.
In the second offering of the course, I used an online survey 
to record students’ evaluation of the learning objects, and 
again they rated them positively. Anecdotally, when we 
presented the LOs at the Women’s Studies Consortium, 
a student who had taken my feminist philosophy class 
remarked that such materials would have been helpful in 
that class as well. As a result of these positive responses, 
I was able to secure funding for the project to develop 
learning objects for the feminist philosophy class.
The subsequent developments, in and out of the classroom, 
have been overwhelmingly positive. I, with and without Nik 
and Amy, presented this work at several conferences and 
received positive feedback and requests for links to the 
works. Having worked on the digital learning objects, I was 
more oriented to the use of multimedia in the classroom, 
and I make regular use of additional media beyond those 
produced specifically for this course. These additional 
materials help to illustrate more concretely than otherwise 
the abstract concepts of political philosophy and theories 
of race and gender construction. 
ROADBLOCKS
Time and money are significant barriers. This work can’t 
be done during the semester with my teaching load and 
the students’ course load. Work over the summer requires 
either enough funding to support the student(s) without 
the need for a second job or negotiating work and life 
schedules. Finally, undergraduates graduate faster than 
grad students, so to continue this work, I will need to 
find ways to support ongoing collaboration or rethink the 
kind of project I would pursue. Given the specific skills 
and interests Nik and Amy brought to the project, and the 
“bonding experience” we shared, it would be difficult to 
duplicate the results produced by the original team. 
CONCLUSION
Most instructors currently use multimedia digital learning 
objects in our classrooms. Though it is changing, teachers 
of feminist philosophy and/or philosophy of race may find 
appropriate or relevant materials are scarce. In that case, 
it is possible to collaborate with others to produce them. I 
welcome questions and comments regarding the process 
and the results; contact me via email, lebensc@uww.edu, 
or my blog. Even if this particular project (multimedia 
learning objects) is not feasible, consider developing 
some other type of learning object or conducting research 
in collaboration with undergraduate students. It is an 
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Yet, in some cases, this counsel seemed to yield a conflict 
between my pedagogical commitments as a philosopher 
and as a feminist. It is one thing to consider “diverse” 
perspectives when it simply means “distinctly different” 
perspectives, and quite another thing to promote “diversity” 
as a commitment tied to the toppling of hegemonic 
structures (as it is typically understood by feminists, critical 
race theorists, and others). Margaret Crouch argues that, 
as neoliberal thinking has spread into the public sector, 
influencing how we think about higher education and its 
purpose, this second version of diversity has been eclipsed 
by the first. There is little cachet in diversity arguments 
based on “social justice or ethical obligation” these days. 
Diversity, in business-speak and even higher-ed speak, 
has become equivalent to “difference”; this conception 
requires little in the way of difficult conversations about 
power imbalances, structural inequality, and “isms” of 
oppression (such as white racism, sexism, classism, 
heterosexism, etc.). Promotion of diversity is not typically 
couched in terms of “righting wrongs” or addressing 
inequality, as explicitly adopting these justifications would 
require admittance that something is still wrong, that our 
society is still plagued by inequality and that there are both 
oppressed and oppressor groups; rather, it is promoted in 
terms of “the efficiency of an organization and its greater 
competitiveness.”3
This insight of Crouch’s has helped me examine a shift I 
made in recent years to include the issue of rape in my 
introductory practical ethics courses. In most of the applied 
ethics anthologies that I have surveyed, rape and sexual 
violence are absent. When one reflects on the fact that 20–
25 percent of college-age women are sexually assaulted 
in the United States,4 and that the omnipresence of sexual 
violence is a tremendous challenge to the autonomy 
and well-being of women worldwide, this is a striking 
absence.5 While I have had no qualms about calling rape a 
“contemporary moral problem,” for years I did not include 
it in my course under that name because I worried that I 
could not come up with “diverse” readings in the “pros 
and cons,” “conflicting perspectives” sense of the term. 
The topics in my course (I assumed unreflectively) were 
best examined, and the students best served, by reading 
authors who would disagree profoundly with one another, 
who would confront one another with equally compelling 
arguments, and who would compel students to consider 
perspectives radically different from their own. Yet I could 
not imagine how to do that responsibly on this issue. 
Sure, I might assign controversial pieces on rape—some 
by feminists, and some even by female anti-feminists 
such as Camille Paglia or Katie Roiphie—but given the 
near-certainty that many of my female and some of my 
male students are survivors of rape and sexual violence, 
the risk of creating a class discussion that might result in 
these students feeling further alienated, misunderstood, or 
blamed for the violence they had suffered was simply not 
a risk I was willing to take. It seemed safer simply not to 
address the issue at all.
I justified my decision to leave this issue out primarily in 
terms of the safety and emotional well-being of my female 
students. But beneath that justification, I believe, I was also 
worried about the academic “safety” of including issues 
introductory-level philosophical ethics courses. I argue that, 
in the context of such classes, a desire to prove academic 
philosophy’s relevance to a society enamored with the 
promise of market-based skills (Crouch’s “corporatizing” 
forces) often works counter to the goal of increased 
attention to the needs and contributions of oppressed 
and underrepresented groups. Yet feminist philosophical 
strategies can help demonstrate that emphasis on the 
market-based skills that emerge from philosophical training 
need not run counter to increased attention to the needs 
of oppressed groups. By way of one modest example, 
I suggest a feminist pedagogical shift that might help 
address the needs of underrepresented students while still 
satisfying some of the market-based and tradition-based 
justifications of philosophy as a discipline. 
For years it was a kind of mantra of mine—both when 
talking about my philosophy department and our ethics 
center—that in philosophical ethics courses we don’t teach 
students what to think, we teach them how to think. The 
distinction, although simplistic and admittedly problematic, 
served an important purpose: for the layperson it helped 
me differentiate philosophical instruction from religious 
instruction, and also from “character education”—two 
areas that also lay claim to teaching ethics, but from a 
position where values are more explicitly and unabashedly 
predetermined. In our courses, I often explained (sometimes 
defensively, sometimes self-righteously) the content, 
definition, and conception of one’s values are laid out for 
scrutiny, open to challenge, and yet-to-be determined. We 
teach students how to examine their values comparatively 
and critically, and we leave it to them to determine 
which they will ultimately adopt. Guided primarily by the 
pedagogical values of promoting autonomous and rational 
thinking, I invoked the traditional boast that students come 
out of our classes with more questions, with less certainty, 
than that with which they entered. Debate is encouraged, 
differences in perspective are explored, students’ eyes are 
opened, and sometimes their worlds are turned upside 
down. I tended to see all of this as perfectly consistent with 
my department and university’s commitment to diversity,2 
for when everything is open for question, and no view is 
immune to criticism, we all are presumably better equipped 
to operate on equal footing.
In ethics courses, particularly those that deal with practical, 
contemporary moral issues, this pedagogical approach 
would seem to be well fertilized by a “pro vs. con” or 
“conflicting perspectives” structure. Students get a better 
understanding of the contentiousness of (and their own 
positions in) the debates over abortion, euthanasia, the 
death penalty, gun control, etc., by examining opposing 
viewpoints, and by refusing to view any position as immune 
to scrutiny. While, for me, it can be personally difficult and 
emotionally taxing to assign and promote consideration of 
positions with which I fundamentally disagree, I would use 
the same counsel on myself that I offer to my students: 
it’s good to take seriously the views that one abhors; 
understanding a variety of views, delving into “diverse” 
perspectives, stretches our students’ minds and does us 
all some intellectual good. 
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value-laden “content”; I am teaching value-neutral critical 
thinking “skills”—how to think, not what to think. 
In philosophical ethics courses in particular, I find myself in 
a kind of perfect feminist-philosophical storm that makes 
responsible inclusion of an issue like rape especially difficult. 
Winds from one direction push me to worry about being 
perceived as a political (liberal) “advocate” rather than an 
apolitical (neutral) “scholar.” Winds from another direction 
push me to worry about the institution’s perception of my 
department and discipline’s relevance for millenials (who 
are presumably best served by having transferrable “skills” 
rather than “knowledge”). Crouch notes that “the academy 
has, to a large extent, accepted the neoliberal model of the 
university as a corporation, the primary mission of which is 
to sell information and skill sets and to produce workers.”11 
So the academy generally, and philosophy specifically, 
seem justifiable, save-able, if we can prove our fittingness 
to this model. Crouch contends, “Public universities and 
liberal arts colleges once considered it their mission to 
further the ‘common good’, by educating students to 
be good citizens and better economic agents.”12 But the 
second component of that mission is clearly overshadowing 
the first these days, and what it means to be a good citizen 
is increasingly intertwined with capitalist production. 
Students have become “consumers”13 and knowledge in 
terms of “marketable skills” has become our “product.” 
Fish’s solution amounts to the recommendation that we 
protect ourselves by proving that our work does not run 
contrary to this new game (played on the corporatized 
model). He does not accept or endorse the game, but 
following his advice ultimately undermines our ability to 
question the “game” itself. In the current climate, Crouch 
notes, “[t]he understanding of what it means to be human is 
apparently not in demand . . . anthropology, literature, and 
philosophy—all of the humanities, in fact—are valueless in 
the corporatized university.”14 Fish decries the view that the 
humanities are “valueless,” but his solution leaves us and 
our students relatively powerless to examine “what it means 
to be human” and to confront the assumption that there is 
a single answer to this question. This, Crouch and I believe, 
should be our “business.” As Crouch notes, “philosophy 
should be one of the best disciplines for clarifying the 
limits of neoliberal higher education, and for showing that 
there are significant moral and pragmatic arguments for 
the inclusion of diverse groups, diverse disciplines, and 
diversity within disciplines, in the university.”15
Yet in order to do this, philosophers need to sort through 
the ways in which Fish’s exhortations seem to parallel 
some of the values deeply embedded in philosophy as a 
discipline, and challenge them, particularly from a feminist 
perspective. For instance, I initially found some of Fish’s 
advice compelling because my traditionally conceived 
discipline so highly values autonomy16 and critical thinking; 
indoctrination of my students runs directly counter to these 
values and most of I what I take pride in. Philosophy as 
a discipline has encouraged me to feel proud of the fact 
that students protest teasingly and good-naturedly, in the 
classroom and in their evaluations, that I am “so frustrating” 
because I rarely tell them what I think; instead, I insist 
that they answer their own questions. I respond, perhaps 
in my syllabus about which I could not be, or at least not 
be perceived as, neutral. Such worries are propped up by 
Stanley Fish, former dean of the College of Liberal Arts and 
Sciences at the University of Illinois, Chicago, who counsels 
academics never to reveal our ethical and political positions 
to students. In light of the current political climate, under 
which higher education is at risk of being co-opted and 
transformed by a for-profit model, he argues that professors 
ought to avoid advocacy of any particular political position in 
the classroom. His provocatively titled book Save the World 
on Your Own Time (2008) rails against professors who try to 
do too much “engaged” or advocacy work in their classes. 
Our job, he claims, is simple and twofold: “(1) introduce 
students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry 
that had not previously been part of their experience; and 
(2) equip those same students with the analytical skills—of 
argument, statistical modeling, laboratory procedure—that 
will enable them to move confidently within those traditions 
and to engage in independent research after a course is 
over.”6 When we try to go beyond this, he says, we become 
ineffective teachers, and, most importantly, play into the 
hands of those who attempt to co-opt or deny the value of 
higher education, particularly those who doubt the value of 
the liberal arts. For, it is “when teachers offer themselves 
as moralists, therapists, counselors, and agents of global 
change rather than as pedagogues that those who are on 
the lookout for ways to discredit higher education (often 
as a preliminary to taking it over) see their chance,” Fish 
claims.7
When we reveal what we ourselves think in the classroom, 
he says, we step over the line of what’s appropriate to, 
fitting for, our jobs. His exhortations rest on affirming a line 
“between analysis and advocacy.”8 The work of the scholar 
in higher ed is to engage students in the former and (at 
least in the classroom) to refrain from the latter. To those 
of us that might suggest, “Teaching is a political act,” Fish 
sharply rejoins: “Only bad teaching is a political act.”9
Of course, plenty of academics dispute Fish in compelling 
ways. And although philosophers are well-equipped 
(as highly trained critical thinkers) to take issue with the 
conceptual lines Fish attempts to draw, my sense is that few 
of us feel particularly safe in doing so publicly, as we are 
less well-equipped to be taken seriously by administrators, 
boards of trustees, and the wider public. These days our 
discipline has a tough time justifying its existence in higher 
education, mostly because our departments are not leading 
contributors to the university’s bottom line (particularly in 
numbers of majors). Crouch notes that, when threats to 
cut philosophy programs are made “the administrative 
justification is usually that philosophy departments are not 
cost-effective, are not graduating enough students per year, 
or are not garnering enough external funds for research.”10 
Despite the fact that our cost-effectiveness can typically 
be disputed easily (in the number of students—instead 
of numbers of majors—we teach, and in the relatively 
inexpensive ways in which we teach without labs or other 
research and instructional expenses), we find ourselves 
often on the defensive. In my case and I suspect in many 
others, this defensiveness finds its way into the classroom, 
construction of syllabi, and perhaps even creation of 
texts. It translates into my defense that I am not teaching 
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What had not initially occurred to me when I first started 
teaching such a course—particularly when I was fresh 
out of graduate school—and seems so obviously narrow 
now, is that I could change this narrow conception of 
philosophy (and the academy). I could still engender 
philosophical debate by addressing diverse conceptions of 
responsibility for rape and diverse possible solutions. This 
has required changing how I structure the course, doing it 
differently from the structure of most ethics anthologies, 
and telling my students what I am doing: on some issues, 
I now tell them, we will focus discussions on whether a 
particular decision, act, or policy is morally permissible 
(e.g., abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty) and in what 
circumstances (if any) it would be so; with other issues we 
will start from the assumption that a particular issue is not 
morally permissible (e.g., racism, sexism), and that it is a 
problem requiring discussion about diverse solutions. For 
instance, I tell them, I will assume that most of you think 
rape is a problem—in the sense that it is wrong—and 
our discussions will focus on various ways to understand 
and to solve the problem.20 In this way, students are still 
encouraged to challenge one another (and themselves) 
and confront unfamiliar perspectives, but they do so in 
a way that runs a much smaller risk of alienating and/or 
doing harm to rape survivors in my classrooms.21
This rather simple shift, I suggest, has been a small but 
useful strategy toward correcting the ways in which 
academic philosophy “has largely ignored its own 
whiteness and maleness, both among its faculty and among 
its students.”22 Students (of all genders) typically report at 
the end of the semester that their discussion of rape was 
one of the most eye-opening and transformative of the 
class. Given that it is a topic that almost all of the women 
in the class (and some of the men) can identify with, in one 
way or another, it helps them feel connected with, excited 
by, challenged by, philosophical thinking. Almost all of 
them have personal experiences that stimulate and spur 
critical analysis, helping them to grasp the ways in which 
philosophical thinking is for them, relevant to them, helpful 
to them. Crouch reminds us that “we should explore the 
possibility that philosophy has failed to integrate the sorts 
of issues, problems, and methodologies that women and 
nonwhite people find interesting and relevant” and this 
is one small but perhaps useful shift for highlighting and 
correcting implicit bias in our discipline.23
NOTES
1. Crouch describes neoliberalism as follows: “Neoliberalism is 
devoted to the principle that the market is the best means of 
producing and distributing resources. This principle is familiar 
from some forms of classical liberalism, often termed ‘free 
market’ capitalism.” See Crouch, “Implicit Bias and Gender (and 
Other Sorts of) Diversity in Philosophy and the Academy in the 
Context of the Corporatized University,” 213.
2. Webster University, where I teach, is difficult to describe as a 
whole, since it includes a global network of campuses in Europe, 
Africa, and Asia, as well as a number of small campuses in 
metropolitan and military sites throughout the United States. Yet 
the home campus where I teach at the undergraduate level, in 
suburban Saint Louis, Missouri, is perhaps best described as a 
small, private, liberal arts institution, where my classes of mostly 
traditional-age, non-military students are no larger than twenty-
five seats. A significant component of our marketing and self-
description includes the claim that “Diversity and inclusion are 
ad nauseum, “what do you think?” And I believe it is 
pedagogically crucial that students not feel they are being 
preached to, and that they do their own work of thinking 
critically and evaluating all claims. Elements of this seem 
to complement Fish’s recommendation to “academicize”: 
“to academicize a topic is to detach it from the context of 
its real world urgency, where there is a vote to be taken or 
an agenda to be embraced, and insert it into a context of 
academic urgency, where there is an account to be offered 
or an analysis to be performed.”17 If I stick to the level of 
questioning whether there is a problem—what its terms 
are, how it might be analyzed from different perspectives—
but don’t necessarily presume in our discussions that 
something is a problem, then I seem to conform to Fish’s 
advice. The difficulty with this, of course, is that sometimes 
the act of questioning whether something “is” a problem 
is to betray or convey a kind of political position itself. 
Questioning whether rape, for instance, “is” a problem 
seems to indicate at best ignorance, at worst skepticism, 
of the suffering of many of my female students.
In my Feminist and Gender Theory courses (courses Fish 
says are clearly outside the bounds of “academicization”), I 
build from a political position that interlocking oppressions 
are a serious problem. I certainly don’t take this as a given—
we examine texts that make this argument, and also ones 
that provide counterarguments—but in order to advance 
to a deeper level, at some point I assume that students 
also see these as problems that require solutions. This, 
presumably, would constitute a failure to academicize, 
according to Fish, and goes perilously beyond “doing my 
job.” The great risk, he says, is that I cannot effectively 
defend myself against conservative interest groups that 
might claim I am brainwashing my students from a left-wing 
perspective. If I cannot claim that I am objectively, neutrally 
examining a topic, keeping my own political commitments 
out of the classroom, then I (and academia in general) 
cannot effectively stand ground against the accusation that 
we are “indoctrinating” our students.
I do not want to downplay the seriousness of the risk Fish is 
concerned about in today’s political climate. But it is worth 
keeping in mind, I think, that there are related risks in not 
questioning the game, as well, in trying to prove our worth 
to a standard we did not set. Kristin Shrader-Frechette, for 
instance, reminds us that “alleged neutrality [rather than 
advocacy] actually serves the status quo,”18 and she adds: 
[“T]o avoid uncritical acceptance of status quo values one 
must criticize values rather than remain ethically neutral 
in all cases.”19 Returning to the topic of rape, then, my 
failure to address it and to name it as a “contemporary 
moral problem” only cements or adds to its invisibility 
and thereby its intractability as a problem. In failing to 
engender philosophical debate or even discussion on 
this topic, I was allowing myself to be constrained by a 
certain conception of what debate in my courses had to 
look like: that philosophical debate “proper” would revolve 
around whether an issue is right or wrong, permissible or 
impermissible, and would involve sharply opposing views; 
since I could only, in good conscience, represent rape as 
wrong and impermissible, I would be unable to cultivate 
proper philosophical discussion. 
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that rape is morally wrong—is an unjust approach to teaching the 
topic of rape.
21. It does not mean, however, that no harm is done. I still worry 
profoundly about these discussions, and always introduce 
the class and preface our discussions with a note of caution 
for survivors of rape. I warn them that they will read and view 
material that may have a “triggering” effect, and that they should 
feel free to leave the classroom at any time or set up alternative 
assignments ahead of time if they do not feel safe participating 
in class discussions. I am aware of the recent debates about 
“trigger warning” requirements for college syllabi, and although 
I have not made up my mind about whether this is good policy, 
and certainly appreciate some of the academic risks to such 
policies, it is perhaps fair to say that I offer a verbal “trigger 
warning” in my own classrooms. (Thanks to the APA newsletter 
reviewers for pointing to the relevance of these debates.)
22. Crouch, “Implicit Bias,” 219.
23. Ibid., 220. Crouch notes: “Feminist philosophers and critical 
race philosophers have revealed these assumptions in their 
critiques of mainstream philosophy . . . their revelations seem to 
have been taken up by few, primarily philosophers whose work 
focuses on issues of justice and oppression. That is, the bias has 
been revealed, but it has not been recognized as a bias by many 
of those who possess it. . . . The bias is about gender, race, and 
ethnicity, as well as the very definition of philosophy, and so has 
significant practical implications for those who wish to study and 
develop careers in philosophy” (219).
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State of the Union: The APA Board of 
Officers
Sally J. Scholz
VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY
The mission statement of the American Philosophical 
Association specifies that, as a professional organization, 
the APA “works to foster greater understanding and 
appreciation of the value of philosophical inquiry.” In this 
paper, I offer a glimpse into the history of the APA board 
of officers focusing on gender demographics. Given the 
unique structure of the APA, this look into our past as a 
professional organization offers some insight into where 
we are now and what sort of projects the board and its 
constituents ought to undertake in the future. I argue that 
in order to “foster greater understanding and appreciation 
of the value of philosophical inquiry” the APA must 
core values—we offer a welcoming environment.” http://www.
webster.edu/about.
3. Crouch, “Implicit Bias,” 216-17.
4. http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/sv-datasheet-a.pdf; 
https://www.rainn.org/public-policy/campus-safety
5. Perhaps this will change, now that rape and sexual assault on 
college campuses have been identified as a major problem 
by the White House: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/22/memorandum-establishing-white-house-
task-force-protect-students-sexual-a. (Thanks to APA newsletter 
editors for this reminder.)
6. Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, 12.
7. Ibid., 14. Fish’s counsel runs counter to the trend in U.S. 
higher education to promote more “engaged” scholarship (see 
Association of American Colleges and Universities: https://aacu.
org/civic_learning/index.cfm), and perhaps even to the new REF 
(Research Excellence Framework) standards to be rolled out 
in the UK by the end of 2014, through which funded research 
must demonstrate its impact beyond the walls of its academic 
institution: http://www.ref.ac.uk/.
8. Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time,  50.
9. Ibid., 70. In response to the objection that value-neutrality 
is impossible, that teaching on this model requires apathy 
and indifference, Fish qualifies his argument: we need not be 
indifferent, but our hopes for students must not translate into 
any kind of betrayal of our partisan leanings, or encouragement 
of one form of advocacy over another. Fish is not arguing that we 
cannot hold such commitments, but that as instructors we should 
keep them to ourselves. The difficulty of achieving the type of 
neutrality Fish advocates has nothing to do with its legitimacy 
and importance, he might say. If it’s tough to keep our views to 
ourselves, he might answer, then we’ll just have to try harder.
10. Crouch, “Implicit Bias,” 217-18.
11. Ibid., 222.
12. Ibid., 213.
13. Ibid., 214.
14. Ibid., 215.
15. Ibid., 213. My emphasis.
16. Of course, the conception of autonomy valued is not always 
particularly well defined or nuanced. Just as “rational” is 
sometimes simplistically defined as the opposite of “emotional,” 
“autonomous” is sometimes simplistically understood as the 
opposite of “heteronomous.” For more sophisticated and 
compelling conceptions of autonomy, see Marilyn Friedman’s 
Autonomy, Gender, and Politics, and Catriona MacKenzie and 
Natalie Stoljar’s edited collection Relational Autonomy: Feminist 
Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self.
17. Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time, 27. Italics in original.
18. Shrader-Frechette, “An Apologia for Activism: Global 
Responsibility, Ethical Advocacy, and Environmental Problems,” 
634.
19. Ibid., 636. She also notes that “Advocacy of any kind . . . is 
viewed as inimical to objectivity in general and to the academy 
in particular” (634), and “[t]o represent objectivity as neutrality 
is also to encourage persons to mask evaluational and ethical 
assumptions in their research and policy and hence to avoid 
public disclosure of, and control over, those assumptions” (636).
20. This is not unlike Peter Singer’s strategy in “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality”: “I begin with the assumption that suffering and death 
from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. I think most 
people will agree about this, although one may reach the same 
view by different routes. I shall not argue for this view. People 
can hold all sorts of eccentric positions, and perhaps for some of 
them it would not follow that death by starvation is in itself bad. 
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to refute such positions, and 
so for brevity I will henceforth take this assumption as accepted. 
Those who disagree need read no further” (221). Students rarely 
find fault with this particular strategy of Singer’s, even if they are 
much less sympathetic to some of his other claims. I have yet to 
have a student protest (to me, at least) that my starting point—
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president, president, vice president, secretary-treasurer, 
and representative) sit on the executive committees of 
their divisions as well as on the national board. The national 
office, located at the University of Delaware since 1975, runs 
the business of the APA, an official non-profit organization. 
I will jump back to more history in a moment but I want to 
pause here to fill in more about the current make-up and 
functioning of the board of officers.
As you may know, the APA has a number of committees. 
Not all committees are created equal; six are designated 
as “standing committees” and an additional fourteen are 
“special committees.” Only the chairs of the six standing 
committees sit on the board of officers. The standing 
committees include the committees on academic career 
opportunities and placement; inclusiveness in the profession, 
international cooperation;  lectures, publications, and 
research; status and future of the profession; and teaching 
philosophy. The committee on inclusiveness also includes 
the chairs of a number of special committees. As its charge 
reads, “The chairs of the six diversity committees (Asian 
and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies; Status 
of Black Philosophers; Hispanics; Indigenous Philosophers; 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People; and Status 
of Women) and the ombudsperson for nondiscrimination 
serve as ex officio members of this committee. The 
committee also includes a member appointed specifically 
for her or his expertise on issues related to disability.”2 
The other special committees, to complete the list, are the 
committees on (1) the defense of the professional rights 
of philosophers, (2) non-academic careers, (3) philosophy 
and computers, (4) philosophy and law, (5) philosophy 
and medicine, (6) philosophy in two-year colleges, (7) pre-
college instruction in philosophy, and (8) public philosophy.
All committees submit annual reports that are read and 
discussed (albeit briefly) by the board; the reports were 
formerly published in the Proceedings and are now 
published online. Some reports show more activity than 
others; and committees do, on occasion, recommend their 
own demise or, less drastically, their own reconfiguration. 
The current board is composed, then, of a chair, a vice 
chair, the executive director of the APA, the officers from 
each of the divisions, the six standing committee chairs, 
and, beginning in July, three additional at-large members 
for a total of twenty-eight members. 
This structure makes the APA board interesting and 
challenging. The work of the APA is conducted through ad 
hoc committees, task forces, the divisions, the standing 
and special committees, and of course the national office 
staff. Currently (as of 2012), the board meets four times 
a year (three by conference call and once in-person for a 
grueling but productive three-day meeting). Prior to 2012, 
the board met only once a year at the annual, in-person 
meeting (which was not always as long as it is now). 
Given that many decisions or actions of the board prior 
to 2012 would have to wait until that annual meeting, the 
business of the professional organization was very slow. 
Issues about or at the divisional conferences are handled 
by the divisions. The board oversees the national office, 
embrace a reflexive praxis, and I offer some suggestions 
for incorporating such engaged insights into the APA board 
of officers’ agendas.
A number of different histories of the APA have been 
published over the years, including James Campbell’s 
A Thoughtful Profession: The Early Years of the American 
Philosophical Association, which John Lachs described as 
essential for understanding the “current problems” of the 
APA. What makes that history so interesting, in addition to 
the personalities involved, is the federal structure of the 
APA. If you have ever wondered why the APA can’t seem 
to accomplish what other professional organizations seem 
to accomplish, more likely than not, the answer lies with 
this structure. Yet, I would wager that the vast majority 
of APA members (as well as most of those professional 
philosophers who opt not to join) do not understand the 
federal structure or have no clear idea about what that 
structure means. 
The brief statement on the APA’s website reveals only a 
hint of the full implications. I would like to start with that 
statement and then offer a more complete picture of our 
professional organizational structure, focusing on women. 
We read: 
The American Philosophical Association was 
founded in 1900 to promote the exchange of ideas 
among philosophers, to encourage creative and 
scholarly activity in philosophy, to facilitate the 
professional work and teaching of philosophers, 
and to represent philosophy as a discipline.
Having grown from a few hundred members to over 
10,000, the American Philosophical Association is 
one of the largest philosophical societies in the 
world and the only philosophical society in the 
United States not devoted to a particular field, 
school, or philosophical approach.
The APA’s three divisions, the Central, Eastern, 
and Pacific, founded in 1900, 1901, and 1924, 
respectively, conduct annual meetings at which 
philosophers present research and exchange 
ideas. Since 1927, the American Philosophical 
Association has functioned under a constitution 
providing for a national board of officers.1
It is specifically this board of officers that I would like to 
address in my brief comments.
I. FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND BOARD OF 
OFFICERS
The American Philosophical Association’s unique structure 
is unlike any other professional organization. What is not 
clearly articulated in the brief history I just quoted is that 
each of the divisions is more or less autonomous. Each has 
its own officers, and its own agenda. Each division also 
has its own personality and, over the years, there have 
been major rows and sustained efforts to maintain the 
distinctions as well as the autonomy (except during the war 
years, 1942–1944). Currently, the divisional officers (past 
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The chart shows both the size of the APA board of officers 
and the number of women on the board.4 In the 1980s, the 
Board consisted of just sixteen members: the executive 
director, a chair, chairs from five standing committees, and 
three officers from each division. The three officers included 
the divisional presidents. It was not until the late 1980s that 
presidents served for more than a single year. That explains 
quite a lot about why our professional organization appears 
to be so far behind other professional organizations. We 
were very late in deciding that longer-term commitments 
(or commitments per se) were needed for the health and 
well-being of the professional body. The minutes of the 
board’s annual meetings are available in the published 
Proceedings (usually the November issue but often in the 
January issue as the annual meeting floated a bit back 
then). While those minutes are not always as thorough as 
we might like, they do reveal many progressive attempts to 
bring about change in the organization. The various efforts 
to ensure childcare at divisional meetings are an excellent 
case in point. The history of that cause stretches back 
decades and includes many of the leading philosophers of 
generations. However, the history also shows the difficulty 
of working with the federal structure with rapid rotation of 
divisional officers on the national board. 
The story of women on the board is, as the chart shows, 
inauspicious until recently. From 1980 to 2000, the number 
of women on the board was anywhere from one to five, 
with two being a pretty steady state. It is also worth noting 
that during many of those years, one of those few women 
was Anita Silvers. She joined the board in 1983 and was a 
more or less constant presence for thirty years: as secretary 
of the Pacific Division and later as chair of the inclusiveness 
committee. As the numbers show, she was at least once the 
only woman in the room and for many—far too many—years, 
she was one of two. Ruth Barcan Marcus was chair of the 
which manages membership, member benefits such as the 
newsletters and PhilJobs: Jobs for Philosophers, and many 
of the named prizes and lectures. Some issues actually 
cross the borders between divisions or otherwise affect 
every division. In addition, the board addresses issues of 
the profession including addressing sexual harassment 
in the profession (especially policy for APA-sponsored 
events), articulating best practices for interviewing, and 
establishing recommendations for childcare at divisional 
meetings, among other things. The national office runs 
the day-to-day business and provides the variety of 
member services, including publishing the newsletters 
and managing the member list. In recent years, the work 
of the national office has expanded tremendously as the 
APA seeks to provide more benefits and a more cohesive 
professional body for the membership.
II. HISTORY OF WOMEN ON THE BOARD
Women have been involved in the APA from the early years, 
but, as might be expected, not in the numbers required for 
a “critical mass” for social change. Mary Whiton Calkins was 
the first woman president of the American Philosophical 
Association (later the Eastern Division) in 1918-1919. The 
next was Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna (Eastern) in 
1941-1942 and the third, Katherine Everett Gilbert, was 
1946-1947. Margaret Georgiana Melvin was the president 
of the Pacific Division in 1951-1952, and Isabel Payson 
Creed Hungerland held that office in 1962-1963. In other 
words, there was roughly one woman president across 
all the divisions each decade from the forties through 
the sixties (with no female presidents in the 1920s and 
1930s). The early 1970s had clearly seen the effects of a 
revolution as two of the three divisional presidents were 
female in 1971-1972 (May Brodbeck for the Western3—a 
first for that division, and Marjorie Glicksman Grene for 
the Pacific), a phenomenon seen again in 1975-1976 (Alice 
Ambrose Lazerowitz for the Eastern, 
and Ruth Charlotte Barcan Marcus 
for the Western): the seventies, in 
other words, saw a grand total of 
four female divisional presidents. 
The eighties went back to the 
reliable pattern of just one woman 
for the decade (there were six in 
the nineties; eight in the aughts; 
and we’ve already had seven so far 
for the teens with the promise of t 
more next year). But that is just the 
divisional presidents. And for many 
years, indeed, these were primarily 
honorific titles that required just 
one year of service on the national 
board. That has now changed; and 
in the past four years, the divisional 
presidents have taken a very active 
role in remaking the APA.
If you will humor me, I would like 
to continue this walk down memory 
lane by looking at the last thirty-five 
years of the national board.
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Figure 1. Women on the APA board of officers.
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III. REFLEXIVE PRAXIS
Susan Moller Okin invited us to imagine a situation 
in which the people in power—the people who make 
policy and laws at all levels—have also nurtured a child 
and parented on a day-to-day basis.6 Although she was 
thinking of a liberal state, her insight carries over to the 
profession of philosophy. It also should be augmented 
significantly with other imaginations, such as where 
the people in power in philosophy have lived through 
struggles with poverty, sexual and/or racial harassment, 
inaccessible institutions, and a general sense of not being 
welcome. Patricia Hill Collins explores the standpoint of 
an academic insider-outsider through her work as a black 
woman in sociology;7 this concept is useful in philosophy 
as well. As academic insider-outsiders, those of us who 
hail from underrepresented groups experience the 
academy often as foreign and perhaps even hostile. We 
are also uniquely positioned within the academy to reveal 
elements hitherto unseen. The academic insider-outsider 
is useful when thinking through the background work 
necessary for bringing about change in the profession that 
is so important but rarely acknowledged or seen. As the 
governing body of the American Philosophical Association, 
the board of officers needs the standpoint of academic-
insider-outsiders—at least until it no longer makes sense to 
speak of academic insiders at all.
Recently, the Pacific Division adopted a broad statement 
on program diversity, began collecting data on conference 
participation, and began actively encouraging support 
of diversity efforts by welcoming volunteers for session 
chairs, program ideas, and paper submissions. The Eastern 
Division conducted a similar demographic survey this past 
year. Understanding who we are—a widely diverse group 
of philosophers—and what we need in order to flourish as 
academics has become a model of what the APA national 
board can, should, and must do. I offer three suggestions 
for us as regular APA members (and non-members whom I 
hope might join or rejoin) for how we might help to change 
the profession. I focus on the board not because that is 
the best or the only avenue of changing the profession but 
because that is my focus in this reflection on the state of 
the union.
IV. INCORPORATING ENGAGED INSIGHTS INTO 
APA BOARD AGENDAS
First: Learn about the organization. So many of us learn 
about the unique structure and governing bodies of the 
APA by actually being on the board. Even regular committee 
members are rarely aware of the complex structure or 
decision-making policies and practices. They don’t know 
what role their committee plays in the overall structure. 
I say this from experience of being on two standing 
committees and one special committee. It was not until I 
chaired a standing committee and attended my first board 
meeting that I began to understand the APA’s complex 
structure. I think most committees or committee members 
are unaware of their place in the overall governance (and 
financial) structure.
Those of us on the board ought to share what we know 
both for transparency and for strategic planning (including 
board for six years (1977–1983) and in 1982-1983 Philippa 
Foot was president of the Pacific Division; aside from those 
two positions, the numbers for the 1980s show women in 
the position of divisional secretaries. Truly, that position is 
vital for the functioning of the national organization as well 
as the divisional meetings, but it is also worth noting that 
the social imaginary needed to be changed.
As I mentioned, sometime in the late 1980s, the board 
increased to twenty-two members to include the vice 
presidents and the past presidents of each division. 
This allowed for three-year terms, rather than the single-
year honorific terms of former divisional presidents. The 
early 1990s experienced a “surge” of involvement of, or 
inclusion of, women, but by the late 1990s, things were 
back to normal with women making up 5–14 percent of the 
board. Between 2000 and 2001, additional positions were 
included: a vice chair, a treasurer (a position held by the 
remarkable Steffi Lewis the entire time), and the chair of 
the inclusiveness committee. We see a marked increase in 
the number of women on the board at that time. There were 
some turbulent years in the mid-aughts. Karen Hanson took 
the reins as chair of the board; she not only brought things 
under control, she also conducted a thorough study of the 
APA and issued what is now called the “Hanson Report,” 
making crucial recommendations for significant changes. 
From 2004–2008, there was no vice chair, bringing the 
overall number on the board down to twenty-four. Dramatic 
changes are evident in 2010, when the number of women 
on the board really starts to climb, reaching over 50 percent 
for the first time for the 2009-2010 board year (52 percent). 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that while feminists 
were powerful voices in the prior years, four well known 
feminists sat on the 2011-2012 board, including Claudia 
Card, Alison Wylie, Linda Alcoff, and Anita Silvers5–and all in 
positions of power over other branches as past presidents 
or presidents of a division or as chair of one of the standing 
committees.
For 2014-2015, the board has grown again to a total of 
twenty-eight with three additional elected “at large” 
members, all three of whom are women. Currently, sixteen 
women are on the board for 2014-2015, including the board 
chair, Cheshire Calhoun. The executive director, Amy Ferrer, 
is a remarkable force, who brings a wealth of knowledge 
running non-profits. In short, in the last five years, we have 
taken our place as 50 percent of the national board of 
officers.
My reading of this all too brief account of the APA’s history—
specifically the history of the national board—is twofold. On 
one hand, we have a right to be impatient. This profession 
is very late in changing and embracing a gender balance. 
On the other hand, we are living in exciting times. The last 
three years on the board have seen dramatic changes and 
I was genuinely thrilled to look around the table to see 
50 percent women, 10–20 percent people of color, and 
approximately 10 percent disabled as well (depending on 
the year). There are also a significant number of people on 
the board who are young enough to know the importance 
of using new technologies. 
But, obviously, there is a lot more work to do. 
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But even more than that, by pay the dues I mean that we 
ought to put in the time—and expect others to put in the 
time—before issuing a complaint. It is too easy to use the 
blogosphere to air grievances but as the past few months 
have demonstrated, many of the grievances people 
raise against the APA are really issues that the APA as a 
formal organization has addressed—and was a leader in 
addressing. The APA is too easily seen as a scapegoat for 
issues that afflict the profession generally. Pay the dues by 
learning what policies the APA has and discussing issues 
with committee chairs before blaming the organization 
that, flawed though it is, has also been a defender of rights 
within the profession. 
Each step forward often includes a step back. But we 
are building momentum and having the critical numbers 
of folks on the board who have lived through racism, 
sexism, heterosexism, poverty, welfare, domestic violence, 
disability, illness, injury, childbirth, menstruation, and all 
those other real things that make us interesting and human 
is crucial to continuing to change.8
NOTES
1. “History of the APA,” http://www.apaonline.org/?page=history.
2. The rich resources of the APA website are available at http://
www.apaonline.org.
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4. Data collected by author from culling the board lists from the 
minutes. Available to APA members at http://www.apaonline.org/
members/group_content_view.asp?group=110449&id=209151 
and JSTOR.
5. I was also on the board at this time.
6. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, 170–86.
7. Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: The 
Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought.”
8. I am here using “real” in the same sense as the woman cited 
in Gloria Steinem’s essay “If Men Could Menstruate,” whose 
period came while she spoke at a conference. Steinem reports, 
she “said to the all-male audience, ‘and you should be proud to 
have a menstruating woman on your stage. It’s probably the first 
real thing that’s happened to this group in years.’” http://www.
haverford.edu/psych/ddavis/p109g/steinem.menstruate.html.
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networking between committees). As chair of the 
committee that issues awards and prizes, for instance, 
I learned that the APA could and should receive more 
nominations. The committee in its current instantiation is 
attentive to diversity (demographic and philosophical), but 
we are not always given the candidates that allow us to act 
on that. My advice: nominate. The APA has over two dozen 
prizes, ranging from $500 to $30,000. We worked with 
other committees to generate applicants and even design 
new prizes. This sort of networking between committees 
works to the benefit of the organization and helps to create 
an atmosphere where a variety of voices and perspectives 
are respected.
Moreover, all of us in the profession should think about 
the right people to serve on the board. When that call for 
nominations comes, think of the positions of committee 
chairs differently. These are not CV-building positions; 
they are profession-shaping positions. In addition to the 
elements of diversity previously mentioned, there is one 
more that needs to be considered. All too often, the majority 
of members on the board come from R-1 institutions 
with large endowments. The research support funds and 
teaching releases at those institutions do not reflect the 
reality of most academic philosophers. As we think about 
board nominees, I would encourage us to think about 
populating the board with a wider variety of academic 
social classes. It might be argued that that further burdens 
the burdened—and it does—but the profession will not 
change unless the reality that most of us live is reflected in 
the discussions and decisions of the board.
My second suggestion is to use the organization. Ask 
a board member to take up a topic; use the committee 
structure. The six standing and fourteen special 
committees of the APA were designed and developed to 
address specific concerns in the profession. When they 
are chaired well, they function well. The task forces and 
ad hoc committees—like the recent task force on sexual 
harassment chaired by Kate Norlock and the task force on 
diversity chaired by Elizabeth Anderson—are particularly 
effective. They offer timely reports to problems identified 
by the board, problems often brought to our attention by 
regular members using the organization.
When we have longer-term issues of concern, we can raise 
them with specific committees. Many chairs welcome this 
input. All chairs ought to. We might also approach chairs or 
committee members with a plan of action that seeks the 
support of the APA committee structure.
My third point is what I call “Pay the dues.” Here I don’t mean 
merely paying the APA dues, although that is important. 
The APA cannot operate without our financial support. It 
has been and continues to be the governing body that 
sets the standards for interviews, sexual harassment 
policy, accessibility, etc. These professional standards and 
interventions have been historically important in changing 
hiring and retention matters. As professional organizations 
go, our dues are quite a steal. 
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encounter difficulties with a slow pace.
Wollstonecraft was herself, of course, that sort of person; 
in a sense, her pleas for the vindication of women as 
creatures possessing a generally responsible human 
rationality run at cross purposes to some of the events 
of her own life. But the two strands of Mary merge, so to 
speak, in her larger purpose: what Wollstonecraft is after 
is a commitment to rationality with a sensibility behind 
it to point it along the way. Thus the difference between 
the life that Wollstonecraft sees for an educated woman 
and the possibilities that she sees for an educated man 
revolve around the notion of commitment and care for 
others, melded by a sort of trained passion. That these 
are important beliefs for Wollstonecraft is obvious from a 
perusal of all her works.4
What Maria needs is an adequate marriage, and a way to 
yoke the emotional power that she possesses to a life that 
would be worth leading. In an essay titled “Reason and 
Sensibility,” Catriona MacKenzie has written:
[T]he overriding preoccupations of Wollstonecraft’s 
work, as well as of her life, were to articulate what it 
means for women to think and act as autonomous 
moral agents, and to envisage the kind of moral 
and political organization required for them to 
do so. Although at times she seemed to identify 
autonomy with reason, defining it in opposition 
to passion. . . . Wollstonecraft also struggled to 
develop an account of women’s moral agency 
that would incorporate not only a recognition of 
women’s capacity to reason but also of their right 
to experience and give expression to passion, 
including sexual desire.5
The expression of both passion and sexual desire were, 
of course, central issues in Wollstonecraft’s life. Perhaps 
one of the best exemplars of Wollstonecraft’s position on 
the unification of passion and reason is the character of 
Jemima in Maria. More so than the title character herself, 
Jemima embodies the challenge of a female intellect with 
the misfortune of grinding poverty at that stage in England’s 
history. It seems in her case that her every attempt to better 
herself—to make herself more aware of the world around 
her, and how to cope with it—leads to further degradation, 
which is made all the more painful for her because of her 
sensitivity, intelligence, and thoughtfulness.
In constructing this character, Wollstonecraft seems 
to want to be able to say that a different sort of social 
structure might provide for women in general, but would 
have a decidedly beneficial effect on a woman like Jemima 
who finds herself at the bottom of the social scale. If it is 
difficult for the woman of high social standing, how much 
more so for the woman with no connections. After Jemima 
has told a large part of her tale of woe, Wollstonecraft has 
Maria say the following:
And as for the affections . . . how gross, and even 
tormenting do they become, unless regulated with 
an improving mind! The culture of the heart ever, I 
believe, keeps pace with that of the mind.6
Mary Wollstonecraft and the Voice of 
Passion
Jane Duran
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA
Mary Wollstonecraft’s tempestuous life and work have 
been the subject of extended commentary, and, in a 
sense, it would not be fair or accurate to say that hers is 
a reputation that needs resuscitation. Nevertheless, there 
are, so to speak, two Marys—there is the Enlightenment 
thinker who is the author of both the Vindication of the 
Rights of Men and the Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 
and the other Mary, author of novellas and letters, and 
passionate woman of her time. Indeed, the two dramatis 
personae here have long been seen by many as being at 
war; it has been difficult for commentators to reconcile 
Wollstonecraft’s appeals to reason with her writing style, or 
with some aspects of her own life.1
None of this would be as problematic as it might 
immediately seem were it not the case that Wollstonecraft 
wrote the second Vindication, manifestly, to attempt to 
show that women are human beings possessing the same 
moral rights as men, and that they have capacities for 
reason that, in general, are unfulfilled and unused. Thus the 
very emotional qualities that Wollstonecraft often employs 
in her work might be deemed to be somewhat at variance 
with her stated theses, or so one could argue. That there 
is a holism at work here is an important point that requires 
argument, and an examination of Wollstonecraft’s work 
tends to support it.
I
Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman, is one of Wollstonecraft’s 
attempts to put some of her ideas in fictional form.2 Edited 
by Godwin after her death, it is—like so much literature of the 
time—somewhat difficult to read today, but it is extremely 
helpful in elucidating the role that passion plays for a 
woman of sensibility. The Wollstonecraft of the Vindications 
is concerned that women have never been allowed to 
use their faculties; part and parcel of a woman’s faculties, 
however, is her capacity for passionate attachment. Before 
Maria is able to tell her story to Jemima, she already says 
a good deal that leads us to expect that she has had her 
own trials in adapting some sort of rationality to a life of 
high feeling:
“Have patience!” exclaimed Maria, with a solemnity 
that inspired awe. “My god! How I have been 
schooled into the practice!” A suffocation of voice 
betrayed the agonizing emotions she was labouring 
to keep down; and conquering a qualm of disgust, 
she calmly endeavored to eat enough to prove 
her docility, perpetually turning to the suspicious 
female, whose observation she courted, while she 
was making the bed and adjusting the room.3
At this point we do not know about Maria’s marriage, but 
what we do know is that her trials in keeping her emotions 
in check bespeak the sort of personality that will always 
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The uselessness of the lives of upper class women is not 
a fate to which they must be destined; it is a product of 
social conditions, and Mary Wollstonecraft is quite adept at 
delineating those conditions.
Contra Rousseau, Wollstonecraft does not see a “state 
of nature” as an ideal state. But she is well aware of the 
different uses to which states or governments may be 
put. In a society geared toward a humane notion of 
egalitarianism, the gifts that various individuals have—
especially females—would be allowed to grow and put 
to some use. Indeed, as was customary at the time, it is 
clear that Wollstonecraft does feel that women have some 
special gifts, a point also made by Rousseau. In such a 
society, that which had been put into place by the Creator, 
so to speak, would be allowed to grow in its own way, 
and to profit. The problem is that inegalitarian institutions, 
particularly those aimed toward the wealthy, or toward the 
betterment of males, have a tendency to encourage and 
inculcate behaviors that ultimately lead to “vice.”8
Once again, Wollstonecraft sees no apparent contradiction 
between passion and reason, if they live on amicable terms 
in the same soul. But both her political essays, and works 
such as Maria, show that the unrestrained growth of the 
passions can be harmful indeed.
Examples of the unhealthy society and what it can produce—a 
society based on privilege, and one that protects only or 
mainly privilege—abound in Wollstonecraft’s writings. In 
the second Vindication she notes:
Strengthen the female mind by enlarging it, and 
there will be an end to blind obedience; but, as 
blind obedience is ever sought for by power, 
tyrants and sensualists are in the right when they 
endeavor to keep women in the dark, because 
the former only want slaves, and the latter a play-
thing. The sensualist, indeed, has been the most 
dangerous of tyrants, and women have been 
duped by their lovers, as princes by their ministers, 
whilst dreaming that they reigned over them.9
Again, a social structure based on aristocratic dominance 
produces a sphere in which everyone is kept on a lower 
level, for the good of those on top. But, specifically, with 
respect to women, much that takes place allows for women 
to be demeaned within the confines of the home, even 
while they “dream that they reign.” Such a society is sunk 
in corruption and allows for the proper growth of virtually 
no one.
III
In a sense, Wollstonecraft aims at a sort of perfectibilism 
that is at least not incompatible with what will later become 
a fully developed utilitarianism. It is clear that she feels that 
the greater good of each—the fuller development of each—
leads to the greater good of the whole. Her feminism, 
as we have seen, leads some critics to be wary of her 
emphasis on passion, but leads still others to be concerned 
about her lack of what we might label (in today’s terms) 
a “gender” view. Thus Wollstonecraft is, preeminently, a 
feminist whose avowed goal for women is a set of rights 
This might serve as a summation for all that Wollstonecraft 
truly wants to assert—women have been deprived of ways 
of guiding their affections, and this lack of guidance (and 
the general improper social channeling to which women 
are often exposed) gives rise to the vain creature of 
fashion, so contemptuously treated by Wollstonecraft in 
the Vindication. 
The import of the second Vindication is such that it 
is crucial to get clear on both why it must be seen, 
historically, as a significant philosophical work, and what 
the relationship of that work to Wollstonecraft’s other 
writings is. Although, as has been noted, Wollstonecraft’s 
personal life and relationships sometimes belie what she 
claims to be her reliance on rationality, we must note that 
such considerations are almost never taken into account in 
the work of male philosophers. Thus getting to the heart 
and core of her work is of considerable import.
II
Although it is clear that Wollstonecraft valorizes passion 
yoked to reason and commitment, much of the commentary 
on her work fails to take note of her position on religious 
questions and, tersely, of her metaphysical views, 
somewhat sketchy though they may have been. Spelling 
them out helps to fill in the blanks on why the uniting of 
reason and emotion are so important for her.
Wollstonecraft posits a general sort of Creator, and in 
Enlightenment fashion refuses to be specifically Christian 
about some portions of her doctrine. Instead, in a section 
of the second Vindication titled “The Rights and Involved 
Duties of Mankind Considered,” she notes:
In what does man’s preeminence over the brute 
creation consist? The answer is as clear as that a 
half is less than the whole; in Reason.
What acquirement exalts one being above another? 
Virtue; we spontaneously reply.
For what purpose were the passions implanted? 
That man by struggling with them might attain 
a degree of knowledge denied to the brutes; 
whispers Experience.7
In other words, Wollstonecraft clearly sees a moral 
obligation on the parts of human beings to reaffirm their 
place in the scheme of things by fulfilling the duties for 
which their Creator has prepared them. Although by 
today’s standards Wollstonecraft is no doubt guilty of 
speciesism—and, in much of her work, Eurocentrism—it 
is obvious that the progressive import of her work is that 
there is to be no separation of the sexes insofar as these 
human characteristics are spelled out. Thus “Reason” is as 
available to women as to men, and Virtue is also available 
to all, given that any individual takes the care to attempt 
to inculcate it. Where Wollstonecraft shines is in her ability 
to discern that the bare conditions for the exercise of 
Reason and the attainment of Virtue may not be available 
to all. Thus she sees that many among the most poverty-
stricken—men and women—are denied these conditions, 
and (among the upper classes) women preeminently. 
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literary sort of way. Jemima is a victim of England’s worst 
social conditions, and she is female. She develops what 
at the time would have been regarded as a peculiarly 
female range of vices, and she is herself a proponent of 
the idea that social conditions forced her into such a state. 
But, as we have seen, Wollstonecraft is concerned about 
egalitarianism as a whole. The point of creating more equal 
social conditions is, ultimately, the betterment of society. 
And there is no exaggeration in saying that everything 
Wollstonecraft wrote is dedicated to this end: a society 
infused with passion and governed by reason.
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Immigration Justice
Peter W. Higgins (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2013). 272 pages. $120.00. ISBN: 978-0-7486-7026-0.
Reviewed by Amandine Catala
UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL, 
CATALA.AMANDINE@UQAM.CA
According to what criteria should states grant or refuse 
admission to prospective immigrants? In Immigration 
Justice, Peter Higgins provides the first systematic feminist 
analysis of the philosophical question of immigration. 
Formulating just immigration policies, Higgins argues, 
requires analyzing immigration as a matter of structural 
justice, and hence using gender, race, class, sexual 
orientation, etc., as central analytical categories. That is, 
to the extent that immigration policies have an impact 
on individuals as members of particular social groups, 
whether immigration policies are just can be assessed 
compatible, insofar as is possible, with those given to men. 
As Moira Gatens says,
In her attempt to stretch liberal principles of 
equality to women she neglects to note that these 
principles were developed and formulated with 
men as their object. Her attempts to stretch these 
principles to include women results in both practical 
and conceptual difficulties. These principles were 
developed with an (implicitly) male person in 
mind, who is assumed to be a head of household 
(a husband/ father) and whose domestic needs are 
catered for (by his wife). . . . No matter how strong 
the power of reason, it cannot alter the fact that 
male and female embodiment . . . involved vastly 
different social and political consequences.10
But a fair assessment of this line of critique must make 
implicit (and explicit) allusion to the period in which 
Wollstonecraft was living. We know that her first Vindication 
was specifically addressed to Burke, the same Burke 
who, in his Reflections, wants to know why a thousand 
swords did not come to the defense of Marie Antoinette. 
Wollstonecraft has to fight battles on at least two major 
fronts: the blows for women come in the context of the 
French Revolution, the primary blows of which were aimed, 
obviously, at the aristocracy. Any move that is made at the 
time for a full establishment of women’s rights perforce 
must be a slant or take which draws on the greater line of 
the establishment of human rights in general, and it is, of 
course, men who are paradigmatically the possessors of 
these rights.
All of the foregoing is consistent with what we have already 
articulated as Wollstonecraft’s anti-Rousseauian, or anti-
state of nature, stance. Again, it is not society or civilization 
itself that is the issue: it is the way in which society is 
structured. Gatens is correct in that we see very little 
evidence in Wollstonecraft of the type of feminism that, 
in today’s terms, gives gender its due. But it simply was 
not possible for Wollstonecraft to theorize in that manner 
at that time.
IV
We have been arguing that the apparent tension and 
contradiction alleged to exist in Wollstonecraft between 
the voices of reason and passion is not nearly as serious an 
issue as some have made it out to be. What Wollstonecraft 
is after is a uniting of reason and passion so that the one 
governs the other, but the latter enriches the former. This, 
along with education and a striving for wholeness, will, 
according to Wollstonecraft, ultimately yield the society 
that is best for all.
Part of our argument has been that much of the commentary 
on Mary Wollstonecraft as a thinker omits works such as 
Maria in the discussion of the two Vindications. Although 
we have no evidence that Wollstonecraft thought seriously 
about the notion of genre, the fact that she wrote in a 
variety of modes should signal to us that she took her 
fiction to be important. It is clear that the characters 
drawn in Maria—both the title character and Jemima, for 
example—are intended to further her own arguments in a 
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policies are just for a particular state will be contingent on 
two main factors, namely, the global economic and political 
position of that particular state, as well as the social groups 
most vulnerable to the immigration policies adopted by 
that particular state.
Chapters two and three identify significant problems with 
two prominent types of position in the philosophical debate 
on immigration. In chapter two, Higgins carefully examines 
nationalist approaches to immigration justice. Higgins 
considers well-known arguments advanced respectively 
by Michael Walzer, David Miller, and Stephen Macedo—all 
proponents of prescriptive nationalism, which holds that a 
state’s immigration policy should be guided by that state’s 
“national interest,” understood in political, cultural, or 
economic terms. Collectively, these arguments presuppose 
that there is a morally salient difference between citizens 
and foreigners; great global harms such as severe 
poverty and major basic rights violations are due entirely 
to domestic causes (the explanatory nationalist view); 
immigration is a matter of beneficence rather than one of 
distributive justice (let alone structural justice); nations are 
unified, homogeneous entities; and the economic welfare 
of the receiving state has normative priority (and might 
accordingly require admitting more or less immigrants). 
Higgins’s careful examination of nationalist approaches 
reveals that they rest on both morally inadequate and 
empirically inaccurate assumptions: for example, “national 
interest” more transparently corresponds to “dominant 
interest” and speculation regarding the economic impact 
of skilled versus unskilled migration either fails to take the 
full domestic, let alone global, picture into account or turns 
out to be simply false.
In chapter three, Higgins thoroughly reviews cosmopolitan 
approaches to immigration justice. He first considers 
inclusive cosmopolitan arguments. In this section, he 
surveys two of the most famous arguments in the debate 
on immigration (made respectively by Carens, Chandran 
Kukathas, Will Kymlicka, and Philip Cole, among others): 
that opening borders represents an effective remedy 
for global poverty, and that it is logically entailed by 
liberalism. Higgins shows that both arguments rely on 
inaccurate empirical assumptions. First, the world’s 
poorest most often do not have the means to emigrate. 
Second, poverty does not result merely from domestic 
factors plaguing certain countries. Indeed, brain drain and 
remittances can each exacerbate poverty. Third, structures 
of inequality impacting members of vulnerable groups 
(women, racialized, and poor people) tend to constitute 
a transnational constant between sending and receiving 
societies. The other inclusive cosmopolitan arguments 
challenged by Higgins in this section are the Rawlsian, 
libertarian, and democratic arguments for open borders 
(advanced respectively by Carens, Hillel Steiner, John 
Exdell, and Carol Gould). Higgins next considers exclusive 
cosmopolitan arguments, which hold that the equal moral 
status of citizens and foreigners sometimes requires 
restricting immigration. In this section he addresses 
four arguments: the environmental impact, egalitarian 
ownership, political burden, and global harm arguments 
(advanced respectively by Robert Chapman, Mathias Risse, 
Michael Blake, and Shelley Wilcox). Higgins’s thorough 
only by considering the particular social institutions and 
relations from which those social groups result. Specifically, 
Higgins’s central thesis, which he calls the Priority of 
Disadvantage Principle (PDP), holds that “just immigration 
policies may not avoidably harm social groups that are 
already unjustly disadvantaged” (20). Because the empirical 
context that renders certain social groups vulnerable varies 
from state to state, which particular immigration policy a 
particular state should adopt will depend on the particular 
empirical circumstances that characterize it. In our non-
ideal world, then, the justice of immigration policies cannot 
be determined a priori, but instead will always be context-
dependent. Since it requires that immigration policies be 
adopted by each state on a case-by-case basis, the PDP 
by itself thus neither universally supports nor universally 
precludes restrictive or permissive immigration policies. 
Higgins’s position stands in sharp contrast with the three 
main types of position in the current philosophical debate 
on immigration: the moral sovereignty of states view, 
the prescriptive nationalist view, and the open borders 
view advocated by many cosmopolitans. Philosophically 
innovative and empirically informed, Immigration Justice 
fills a crucial gap in the literature.
In the first chapter, Higgins introduces the general empirical 
and philosophical contexts surrounding the question of 
immigration. The chapter begins by setting aside some 
common misconceptions regarding the patterns and 
causes of international migration, such as the belief that 
most of the world’s migration is from the south to the north, 
by the world’s poorest, who choose the destination that 
they know will maximize their economic prospects; that 
emigration is mainly driven by poverty, persecution, and 
overpopulation; or that open-borders immigration policies 
represent an effective means of alleviating global poverty. 
Global migration data, Higgins explains, shows instead 
that south-north migration accounts for only 35 percent 
of global migration; that most migrants are people from 
socially intermediate classes and from parts of the world 
that are witnessing economic development; that the main 
causes of emigration are personal connections (such as 
family and friends), ecological disasters, and globalization; 
that migration flows tend to follow historical colonization 
and military ties; and that migration from the global south 
to the global sorth contributes to keeping the former 
dependent on the latter. These empirical observations take 
on particular significance in light of Higgins’s concern with 
the structural character of immigration justice. Precisely in 
virtue of this concern, Higgins goes on, in the remainder 
of the chapter, to challenge two problematic assumptions 
that often underlie and shape the philosophical debate 
on immigration: John Rawls’s view that immigration can 
usefully be analyzed through an ideal-theoretical lens; as 
well as the view, held by Joseph Carens or Thomas Pogge, 
for example, that immigration is merely an epiphenomenon 
of global poverty. Higgins argues that ideal theory, by 
failing to consider the structurally unjust character of our 
non-ideal world, will yield normatively inadequate policy 
recommendations; and that immigration policies and 
international migration constitute exacerbating factors 
in global inequalities of wealth and opportunity. Higgins 
concludes the chapter by drawing out its implications in 
light of the PDP: determining which particular immigration 
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state of nature, communitarian, freedom of association, and 
associative ownership arguments for the moral sovereignty 
of states view (advanced respectively by John Scanlan, O. T. 
Kent, Walzer, Christopher Wellman, and Ryan Pevnick). The 
moral sovereignty of states view is a non-substantive view 
that challenges all views that hold that states’ immigration 
policies should be subject to certain principles of political 
morality (that is, all views that provide a substantive 
criterion by which to assess the justice of immigration 
policies). Upholding the PDP (Higgins’s own version of the 
cosmopolitan approach) thus requires defending it against 
prescriptive nationalist principles of political morality 
as well as against competing cosmopolitan principles 
of political morality. In doing so in the remainder of the 
chapter, Higgins stresses the normative priority that the 
capabilities of members of unjustly disadvantaged groups 
should be accorded when selecting immigration policies.
Because capabilities play such a crucial role in Higgins’s 
argument, a somewhat more detailed account of capabilities 
would have been a pertinent addition to delineate more 
precisely the PDP and its implications. Relatedly, Higgins’s 
defense of the PDP, in chapter five and throughout the book 
overall, emerges primarily from the negative critique of 
competing approaches rather than as a positive argument. 
As an explanatory rather than a justificatory chapter, 
chapter four specifies, rather than positively argues for, 
the PDP. Still, by successfully challenging its many rivals in 
chapters two, three, and five, Higgins makes a robust and 
persuasive case for the PDP.
Higgins closes, in the sixth and final chapter, by making 
concrete policy recommendations based on the PDP. 
Specifically, he assesses eight exclusion criteria (poverty or 
financial need, cultural dissimilarity, national origin, social 
group membership, medical condition, criminal history, 
national security, and annual quotas); two admission 
criteria (economic potential and family relationships); and 
three admissions-related immigration policies (emigration 
compensation, emigration restrictions, and emigrant 
taxation).
Like the nationalist and the other cosmopolitan approaches, 
the PDP is not defined by the specific type (restrictive or 
permissive) of policy recommendation that it makes. What 
makes the PDP a uniquely forceful approach to immigration 
justice is that it fundamentally rethinks the relevant social 
ontology of global migration. Migration involves, first, 
individuals not as isolated atoms but as members of 
particular social groups. Migration affects, moreover, 
not only migrating individuals but also non-migrating 
members of unjustly disadvantaged social groups in both 
the receiving and especially the sending societies. This 
means, finally, that migration flows are not causally prior 
to states’ immigration policies, as if the former occurred 
entirely independently of the latter. States’ immigration 
policies have a direct impact on global migration and their 
significantly, yet avoidably harmful, consequences can no 
longer be ignored in discussions of immigration justice. 
Those discussions must therefore be empirically informed 
in the relevant ways—that is, in ways that take the relevant 
social ontology into account.
review of extant cosmopolitan approaches ultimately 
shows that they suffer from an internal inconsistency, from 
a lack of empirical or philosophical support for their own 
conclusions, or from both. Higgins makes clear, however, 
that he does not oppose cosmopolitan approaches 
in principle. Indeed, his own PDP is a further type of 
cosmopolitan approach (since it denies that there is a 
morally salient difference between citizens and foreigners).
Chapters two and three having seriously called into question 
some of the most prominent positions on immigration 
justice, chapters four, five, and six proceed respectively to 
explain, defend, and apply the PDP. In chapter four, Higgins 
spells out each of the axiomatic terms that make up the 
PDP: “just immigration policies may not avoidably harm 
social groups that are already unjustly disadvantaged” 
(108). Drawing on the work of Iris Marion Young and of 
Ann Cudd, Higgins defines social groups as “constituted 
and differentiated from one another by members’ relation 
to social institutions, which condition the opportunities 
of the members of a social group in similar ways” (111). 
Social institutions refer to formal and informal norms 
and practices. Because the existence of social groups is 
a function of social institutions, membership in a social 
group does not depend on self-identification and what 
social groups there are will vary across space and time with 
the social institutions whose product they are (112-113). A 
social group is disadvantaged “when its members tend to 
lack central human capabilities, relative to the members of 
the corollary privileged group” (119). Higgins conceives of 
capabilities as positive freedoms or individuals’ effective 
ability “to do certain things or achieve certain ends (that is, 
to function in certain ways)” (122). Individuals’ capabilities, 
like the social groups to which those individuals belong, 
are determined by the way social institutions operate 
(123). Higgins’s conception of the metric of disadvantage 
in terms of capabilities avoids the problems of both 
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness that both a 
subjective welfare and a resourcist account face (124). A 
social group’s disadvantage is unjust, moreover, when either 
membership in that social group is not voluntary or when 
individuals have a moral right to voluntary participation in 
the group (132). Higgins specifies that he conceives of the 
PDP not as a backward-looking principle that would impose 
“a duty of rectification owed to socially disadvantaged 
groups on account of the unjust disadvantage they 
have experienced” but rather as a forward-looking, 
consequentialist principle (135). (The difference between 
the backward-looking and forward-looking understandings 
of the PDP, Higgins explains, matters not in its defense 
but in its application.) An immigration policy harms a 
disadvantaged social group when an alternative policy 
would bring about more expansive capabilities for that 
group’s members. This harm is avoidable if there is an 
alternative policy that “harms that group less” and that 
“does not harm a more disadvantaged social group” (141).
With the definition of the PDP firmly in place, Higgins turns, 
in chapter five, to the defense of the PDP. Against the moral 
sovereignty of states view, which holds that states are free 
to choose whatever policies they wish, Higgins argues that 
states must choose their immigration policies according 
to certain principles of justice. He rejects the international 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
PAGE 24 FALL 2014  |  VOLUME 14  |  NUMBER 1
people think of bodies as especially valuable and they are 
usually instrumental to health, autonomy, or happiness.
Phillips begins by noting that there is a gendered subtext to 
dualism that elevates the mind and reason at the expense 
of emotions and the body (29). From a feminist perspective, 
embodiment is morally significant because women and 
men do have different concerns in virtue of their distinctive 
bodies, and devaluing the body perpetuates the idea 
that the male body is a kind of moral default, while the 
female body is an anomaly. Moreover, bodily experiences 
like pain and fear are important in understanding the 
distinctive harmfulness of rape (64). Insofar as dualism 
encourages us to think of rape as a “mind crime,” or as 
“sex minus consent,” dualism misses important aspects of 
the phenomenology of rape, particularly the significance of 
harms to the body (63).
I am skeptical of the intrinsic significance of embodiment, 
though I believe that embodiment can be significant for 
conditional reasons, such as the fact that many people 
experience their embodiment as especially significant. 
I am convinced of dualism in part because of science 
fiction hypotheticals such as Derek Parfit’s example of a 
teletransporter.1 Parfit asks us to imagine a teletransporter 
that obliterates every atom in my body on earth and creates 
an atom-by-atom replica at a space station on Mars. Though 
my body (including my brain) has been obliterated, I have 
survived because “what matters” about me, my psychology 
and my memories, woke up on Mars. If this example is 
unconvincing, we needn’t appeal to science fiction to 
make this point. Brain transplants and artificial bodies are 
almost technologically possible. The intuition that we do 
not think that transplants or teletransportation are a threat 
to what matters about a person suggests that we do not 
believe that people are intrinsically embodied, and that 
bodies are more like objects we can possess or inhabit. 
These examples also challenge the claim that dualism is 
question-begging because it cannot explain what is left of 
the self without the body (26). It is true that minds happen 
to require bodies, but bodies are not intrinsically necessary 
for the existence of a mind.
If dualism is plausible, Phillips’s critique of the dualist “sex 
minus consent” theory of rape merits a closer look. There 
is an entire subculture of people who seek consensual 
sex that causes them pain and fear, and view masochistic 
sex as a form of empowerment. Emphasizing the bodily 
aspect of rape seems to suggest that there is at least 
something pro tanto wrong with BDSM, but as long as it 
is consensual, it’s not clear why painful sex or sex that 
causes fear is wrong at all. On the other hand, some rape 
victims may not experience pain or fear when they are 
raped, yet even without pain and fear, rape is nevertheless 
an unconscionable violation. This suggests that lack of 
consent is sufficient to explain why rape is wrong.
One concern about the dualist approach is that it makes 
it more difficult for people to identify with rape victims 
because it masks the fact that we are all vulnerable as a 
result of our embodiment (64). Yet a focus on embodiment 
doesn’t necessarily benefit rape victims. Implicit association 
tests reveal that men who score highly on rape-behavior 
In addition to providing an extremely thorough and insightful 
survey of the literature, Immigration Justice offers a novel, 
compelling, and important contribution to the debate on 
immigration. The book will be of great interest not only to 
scholars and students working on immigration in particular, 
but also to anyone working on territorial rights, nationalism, 
cosmopolitanism, global justice, poverty, development, 
international relations, and feminist philosophy.
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In Our Bodies, Whose Property? Anne Phillips argues that 
human bodies should not be understood as property. 
Her novel and engaging argument for this thesis has two 
steps. First, we are all fundamentally embodied beings 
and, in this way, we are all equally vulnerable, regardless 
of our material positions. Therefore, bodies are not like 
objects we can sell because embodiment is fundamentally 
linked to our moral equality. Secondly, applying property 
conventions to bodies would further undermine economic 
justice because bodily markets are intrinsically unequal, 
and allowing markets in body parts or bodily services 
would have unjust macro-level effects. Together, these 
arguments are a powerful challenge to the idea that 
property conventions should extend to the human body.
In this review, I argue that, contrary to Phillips, we should 
think of bodies as objects, and that property conventions 
should apply to body parts and bodily service markets. 
I first refute Phillips’s claim that we are fundamentally 
embodied beings. This has important implications for her 
discussion of rape and why rape is harmful. I then turn to 
Phillips’s arguments about property and markets. I argue 
that property conventions should apply to bodies because 
organ and surrogacy markets are at least voluntary, unlike 
legal limits on markets. Policies that restrict bodily service 
markets risk making the bodies of the worst-off involuntarily 
subjected to the authority of the political community, which 
is a greater harm than the harms associated with markets. 
1. RAPE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BODIES
In contrast to other objects, bodies could be especially 
morally important either because of their conditional 
relationship with other experiences or goods, or in their own 
right. Phillips argues that bodies are morally distinctive in 
their own right because people are intrinsically embodied 
and the self cannot be understood apart from the body 
(11). Most ethicists would acknowledge that people are 
valuable whether they are valued or not. Phillips’s claim is 
that bodies are also unconditionally valuable because they 
cannot be separated from the people who inhabit them. 
The alternative view, what Phillips calls “dualism,” is that 
the person is distinct from the body. Dualism holds that 
bodies are just like other objects, except for the fact that 
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should not promote markets that are inherently unequal, 
so property conventions should not extend to the body. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that bodily markets are not more 
linked to material inequality than other markets, and that 
bodily markets may alleviate other troubling inequalities 
between healthy and unhealthy people.5 I reject any 
property system that requires people to sell their labor 
or body parts in order to survive, which is why I advocate 
for a basic income. Unlike a basic income, limits on bodily 
markets address material inequality by limiting the options 
of the worst off, rather than by redistributing the wealth of 
the better off.
A related argument against markets is that property 
conventions should not reliably undermine people’s ability 
to recognize our common humanity, which bodily markets 
would do. On Phillips’s account, embodiment highlights 
our shared vulnerability and grounds our moral equality 
(39), and thinking of bodies as property makes it easier for 
purchasers to discount the sacrifice that is made by people 
who sell bodily services or body parts (117). Still, I am not 
convinced that the fact that we all have bodies grounds 
the specialness of the body (18). Time is also a scarce 
resource that highlights our shared vulnerability, yet all 
labor markets sell human time and that practice does not 
undermine perceptions of the moral equality of people who 
work long hours. One could reply that allowing time to be 
governed by market norms does make it harder to identify 
with workers and easier for employers to discount the 
sacrifice of employees. But this argument against property 
conventions risks proving too much by condemning all 
labor markets as pro tanto unjust.
Finally, even if markets in bodily services do undermine 
perceptions of equal moral status, it is not clear that limiting 
surrogacy contracts and organ markets solves the problem. 
Phillips is admirably nuanced in her policy solutions. One 
concern about these solutions, however, is that they treat 
potential surrogates and organ vendors differently from 
other workers. In this way, limits on organ and surrogacy 
markets could undermine perceptions of moral equality 
rather than protecting moral equality. If people who would 
be inclined to provide surrogacy services or organ sales 
are denied the legal right to do so, especially if the reason 
for limiting their occupational freedom are linked to their 
lower economic status, then limits in bodily markets could 
heighten perceptions of inequality and contribute to other 
paternalistic or infantilizing attitudes towards women and 
the economically worst off. Indeed, the same reasons that 
make bodily markets problematic also make any policy 
solutions intended to restrict bodily markets even more 
problematic. I will expand on this argument in the final 
section.
3. MACROLEVEL EFFECTS AND THE PROPERTY 
SYSTEM
Phillips favors limits on bodily markets because she 
maintains that the property system should promote 
equality. Above, I suggested that treating surrogates and 
organ vendors differently in a property system could 
contribute to perceptions of inequality. But Phillips is not 
only concerned with the equality of particular surrogates 
analogues and display rape proclivities are more likely to 
associate images of female bodies with objects.2 Moreover, 
social psychologists find that when women are objectified, 
they are less likely to be perceived as having independent 
minds, and objectification also diminishes perceptions of 
women’s ability to experience pain and causes perceptions 
of incompetence.3 These studies suggest that attentiveness 
to embodiment may diminish people’s ability to identify 
with rape victims, since objectification overemphasizes 
embodiment and deemphasizes a woman’s mind.
2. BODIES AND EQUALITY
Phillips’s rejection of dualism is also significant because 
it supports her arguments against thinking of bodies as 
objects within a broader property framework. If persons 
and bodies are inseparable, then bodily markets could 
be interpreted as akin to markets in people. Phillips 
rejects this equivalence, but she does argue that dualism 
threatens to disparage the body (53) in a way that can 
potentially legitimize thinking of one’s own and others’ 
bodies as resources to be bought and sold (104). Yet this 
possibility is only a concern if it is a mistake to think of 
bodies as marketable resources. In this section, I turn to 
Phillips’s arguments against applying property conventions 
to bodies. While I agree that the property system should 
treat bodies differently from other objects, I will suggest 
that the specialness of bodies is actually a reason in favor 
of thinking of bodies as property.
Even though bodies are not intrinsically different from 
objects like cars or computers, they are very different 
from other objects in virtue of their very close connection 
to people’s minds. Harm to the body can cause physical 
pain as well as emotional distress. At least for now, whole 
bodies are irreplaceable. More than other objects, bodies 
are necessary for people to carry out their intentions. 
Bodies tend to be more intimately tied to a sense of self, 
and people tend to think of their bodies as sacred or 
morally significant. Even if those views are mistaken, it is at 
least morally significant that people overwhelmingly think 
their bodies different from other objects and value them 
differently.
One lesson to take from the fact that people tend to value 
their bodies as especially intimate and important is that of 
all the objects that a property system would deny people 
control over, bodies should be the last on that list. For this 
reason, taxes on income are generally more acceptable 
than the kidney taxes that are proposed by Cecile Fabre.4 
Conscripting a person is morally worse than copying and 
using an idea for the greater good. Of all the objects that 
can be appropriated and controlled, bodies are off limits. 
Phillips interprets this as a consideration against extending 
property conventions to bodies, whereas I will suggest 
that the subjective importance of bodies is actually a 
consideration in favor of bodily markets.
Phillips endorses limits on bodily markets such as organ 
sales and surrogacy contracts for the sake of economic 
justice. She claims it is delusional to think that anyone would 
choose to specialize in selling body parts or services were 
it not for their economic depravation, so bodily markets are 
inherently premised on inequality (120). Property systems 
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This is a book about the social practice of personhood and 
personal identities. Rather than thinking of personhood 
as a status conferred on an individual only in virtue of 
some capacity the individual has, as many philosophers 
have traditionally done, Lindemann argues for a relational 
understanding of personhood in which existing persons 
not only initiate other humans into personhood but also 
collaboratively define their personal identities, hold each 
other in them, and eventually let each other go. She 
explores what such holding and letting go looks like in 
a variety of different contexts through the life course—
pregnant women considering their fetuses, parents rearing 
children, relatives attending dying loved ones—and offers 
analysis of how we might morally evaluate such work. What 
is it to hold others well, when are we required to let go, and 
how can we recognize clumsy, but still valuable, holding 
done by individuals whose own identities are beginning to 
fray?
To give the relatively abstract discussions traction, 
Lindemann populates the book with well-crafted, 
illustrative stories. These short narratives offer the reader a 
glimpse of how identity work plays out in the complicated 
relationships that make up human lives. As she notes in 
the closing chapter, the social practice of holding and 
letting go of the stories that in part comprise the identities 
of our fellow humans is so natural to most of us that it 
goes unnoticed. We do it, but we may not recognize or 
at least make explicit what we are doing. With this book, 
Lindemann encourages the reader to broaden the meaning 
of personhood, to appreciate its deeply social nature.
Personhood, for Lindemann, is the “practice of physically 
expressing one’s personality to other persons who recognize 
the expression for what it is and respond accordingly” (97). 
and organ vendors; she is also concerned with the equality 
of women and economically vulnerable people as groups. 
She suggests that property conventions applied to bodies 
could prevent policy-makers from considering the macro-
level effects of body part and bodily service markets (145).
For example, organ markets could mean that kidneys are 
viewed as permissible forms of collateral for loans and bodily 
service markets could contribute to a society where even 
more invasive uses of employees’ bodies are accepted.6 
Phillips draws an analogy to other labor regulations when 
she suggests that governments in both cases should restrict 
the options of the vulnerable individuals for the sake of 
vulnerable groups (90). This position is not paternalistic; 
rather, the worry is that thinking of some people’s bodies 
as commodities could ultimately make everyone worse off 
by introducing pressure for everyone to commodify their 
bodies.7
I grant that these macro-level harms are possible, although 
I’m not sure it would be a bad thing if people felt pressure 
to sell organs, since that pressure would make organ 
shortages less likely. But even if surrogacy and organ 
markets do lead to social pressure to participate, at least 
the participants in those markets still give their consent. 
In contrast, any policy that limits bodily service markets 
coercively deprives would-be participants control over their 
bodies without giving them the opportunity to consent. 
For this reason, property conventions should apply more 
strongly to body parts and bodily service markets than 
other kinds of markets, because it is more important 
that people are able to consent to what happens to their 
bodies than other objects they control. Even if it is morally 
problematic that poor and middle-income people’s bodies 
are used to patch up or gestate the bodies of the rich, it is 
more problematic if poor and middle income people are 
prohibited from making decisions about their own bodies 
for the sake of social and economic justice. Phillips is aware 
of this concern but does not address the objection that 
legal regulations of bodily markets are particularly wrong 
because people cannot consent to them (30).
Opponents of bodily service and body part markets frame 
the issue as if the pro-market side is exploiting the bodies 
of the poor for their own goals, which in this case are the 
goals of solving organ shortages and assisting infertile 
couples. Those who favor limits on bodily service and body 
part markets also deprive the worst off of control over their 
bodies by supporting legal limits on occupational freedom. 
The difference is that the worst-off consent to participation 
in markets but are never asked to consent to legal limits 
on their economic options. My concern is that any effort to 
limit bodily service and body part markets potentially trades 
voluntary subjugation in the marketplace for involuntary 
legal oppression. Even if property conventions applied to 
bodies did undermine economic justice in some ways, the 
refusal to extend property conventions to bodily services 
and body parts is a greater injustice.
NOTES
1. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press, 1984).
2. Laurie A. Rudman and Kris Mescher, “Of Animals and Objects 
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she may begin to tell stories about the embryo, her 
relationship with it, and her own evolving self-conception. 
She sets the stage for the arrival of a new person, and 
prepares others to expect him/her as well. The stories that 
are told call up new narratives of identity, and these create 
normative expectations about how others should respond. 
Lindemann, borrowing from Ruddick (2000), suggests that 
we can have “proleptic” or forward-looking relationships 
with the fetus, in which we act as if a future state of affairs 
already existed (as if the fetus already is a person) (48). 
Nonetheless, Lindemann is clear that, on her view, fetuses 
cannot count as persons because they do not have their 
own personality to express early on, and later, any proto-
expression of personality is hidden from view and cannot be 
socially recognized. (She grants that the pregnant woman 
herself may recognize some expressions of personality in 
the later stages of pregnancy—“she’s a real kicker”—and 
such stories may begin to form a proto-identity for the late-
term fetus, but Lindemann asserts that “fetal identities are 
too rudimentary to get a purchase on [personhood]” (59)).
Chapter three, “Second Persons,” explores the ways in which 
babies gain personal identities and personhood, even well 
before they are capable of reason or language or many of 
the other traditional philosophical marks of personhood. 
Even very young babies interact with their caregivers and 
imitate them, learning bit by bit how to participate in the 
human social game: its expressions, rules, norms, etc. 
Over time, they learn habits of both thought and action 
that become what Aristotle thought of as “second nature.” 
This chapter also explores how young children get sorted 
into, and learn to sort others into, social categories, such 
as gender, race or ethnicity, religious group, ability group, 
etc. Belonging in such categories is not simply discovered 
through acknowledgement of natural facts but is conferred 
based on widely shared rules that find expression in our 
language, our categorization schemas, our power systems, 
etc. Lindemann cites work by Asta Sveinsdottir (2013) and 
a paper by Sally Haslanger (2003); Haslanger’s 2012 book 
Resisting Reality is a good resource here as well. Resisting 
the identities bound up with deeply engrained social kinds 
is incredibly difficult. We can have an identity conferred 
on us that we want to resist, but it is still possible, even 
likely, that “we will be treated according to who we seem 
to be, even if that’s not who we are” (82). A young black 
man can resist mainstream society’s implicit categorization 
of him as a potential threat or a possible criminal, but he 
may nonetheless be understood that way and feel trapped 
in an imposed narrative web that he struggles to escape. 
Even social misrepresentations of identity, then, can have 
surprising power in holding us in identities we resist. This 
leads to a discussion about the importance of letting go 
of some identities, of recognizing when others whose 
personalities and identities we thought we had characterized 
aptly turn out to contest those characterizations, or simply 
to grow away from them. Our personal identities, then, are 
achieved through interpersonal recognition and response. 
They are not simply an aggregate of our experience and 
narratives told by us and others about that experience but 
a chosen selection of those experiences that confers a 
particular identity: this helps to define me, while that was 
an aberration or a fluke that does not play a significant role 
in my ongoing story.
To be a person, then, a human must have sufficient mental 
activity to have a personality and aspects of that personality 
must be expressed somehow (even if not in language). This 
means that fetuses are not yet persons, and individuals in 
persistent vegetative states and anencephalic infants are 
likewise not persons. But many others—including very young 
infants and individuals with profound cognitive disabilities—
would indeed be persons, not only because they can 
express personality but also because other people can help 
to hold them in their identities. On this view, personhood 
is socially made, not individually discovered. Other persons 
call individuals into personhood and help them develop and 
hold on to their personal identities. Because of this, one 
cannot be a person if one is never recognized as such by 
any other person.
Lindemann opens the book with a chapter that relays her 
family’s experience holding her sister Carla, a child born 
with hydrocephaly, in personhood. Although Carla had 
significant cognitive disabilities and a relatively brief life, 
her family helped to weave an identity for her—a vulnerable 
infant daughter, a playmate, a valued member of the 
household. The identity conferred by each family member 
needed a ground in Carla’s personality and her situation, 
but each family member saw her somewhat differently, and 
the web of these narratives combined with her personality 
gave Carla a personal identity. In Carla’s case, her identity 
was maintained more fully by her family members than 
through her own active contributions. In more typical 
cases, individuals contribute significantly to their personal 
identities from a first-person perspective, based on how 
they understand and identify themselves; but even here, 
the stories and perspectives of others inevitably shape 
one’s personal identity.
One might naturally wonder, though, if some nonhuman 
species ought not be recognized as persons on this social 
view. Is my dog—who decidedly has his own personality, 
expresses it and gets recognition for it, has narratives told 
to help shape his identity—also a person? On this question, 
Lindemann notes that other species may have their own 
social practices that result in something like a community 
of shared assumptions and an interconnected way of being, 
but such creatures do not “share in our form of life” (19). 
Unlike a nonhuman animal, Carla was “born into a nexus of 
human relationships that made her one of us” (20). We love 
other animals and share our lives with them, but they do 
not thereby become persons; what we mean by “person” 
is a social achievement of humans. (This leaves open the 
possibility that other social species may have their own 
versions of something like personhood, which is unique to 
their group and built from their particular social practices; it 
also recognizes the reality that human persons have moral 
obligations to nonhuman animals even if they are not our 
kind of person.) This line of thinking, also explored by Cora 
Diamond (1991) and Eva Kittay (2005), has an intuitive 
appeal, but one imagines some readers wanting more 
justification here.
In chapter two, Lindemann explores the way we might 
begin to call a fetus into personhood. A newly pregnant 
woman, for instance, cannot appeal to any personality of 
the embryo inside her, but if she wants to be a mother, 
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this topic in the future.
All in all, this is a wonderful book, starting with a 
provocative thesis and filled with stories and examples that 
enliven the argument. Readers familiar with Lindemann’s 
work will recognize themes from her book Damaged 
Identities, Narrative Repair, as well as chapters built from 
previously published articles. The completely new pieces, 
and the collection as a whole, however, offer much to be 
appreciated, with thoughtful and compelling analysis of 
issues the previous works raised but did not fully answer.
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Fortunes of Feminism: from State-
Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis 
Nancy Fraser. (London, New York: Verso Books, 2013). 256 
pages. $24.95. ISBN 13:978-1-84467-85-0 
Reviewed by Rita Manning
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY, MANNINGR@IX.NETCOM.COM
This is a very fine collection of essays written from the late 
1970s to the present and organized to reflect major shifts 
in feminist theory and practice. Nancy Fraser describes Act 
One, when the “personal became political,” as a time when 
feminism, in connection with other radical movements, 
“exposed capitalism’s deep androcentrism and sought to 
transform society root and branch” (1). Act Two turned from 
a concern with redistribution to a focus on identity and 
social difference. Act Three refocused on the struggle to 
“subject runaway markets to democratic control” (1). This 
last act should be, Fraser argues, one of the current central 
foci of feminist theorizing and practice.
Part One, titled “Feminism Insurgent: Radicalizing Critique 
in the Era of Social Democracy,” includes four essays. The 
first, “What’s Critical About Critical Theory?,” is a feminist 
critique of Habermas’s analysis of late-capitalism. She 
In the fourth chapter, Lindemann takes up “ordinary 
identity work” and what it means to “respond accordingly” 
to a personality, as well as why that is an important part 
of the practice of personhood. She starts from the under-
appreciated idea that we are all practicing improvization in 
our lives: we can never be sure of what to expect, whom 
we will encounter, or what role we might need to play 
in response, and so we end up performing some roles 
and identities awkwardly (101). Indeed, performances of 
identity and responses to them can go wrong in a variety 
of ways, including 1) someone being “off” mentally, 
because drunk, insane, obsessively holding on to negative 
stories; 2) someone offering misleading expressions of 
identity, as in someone withholding important information 
relative to their identity, or deliberately deceiving another 
about one’s identity pretending to be someone else; 3) 
others misinterpreting what they see, what Lindemann 
calls “misfiring recognition” (109), in which others either 
simply fail to appreciate or give uptake to the individual 
they behold, or they cling to old stories that fail to 
accurately represent the present individual; and 4) others 
offering “misshapen responses” (115) to the persons they 
encounter, as when a woman is recognized as a woman 
but treated as inferior because of an entrenched master 
narrative grounded in sexism. Lindemann explores these 
possibilities and ends the chapter with a discussion of what 
our obligations might be to hold people in their identities 
and/or personhood, or to let them go.
Chapter five explores situations in which people struggle to 
perform their identity work: adult children whose parents 
have dementia, wondering how to appropriately hold their 
loved ones, and when/how to let go, transpersons and 
their families, attempting to articulate and claim seemingly 
impossible identities given engrained social categories 
and master narratives, and hypocrites and wantons, who 
seem to claim identities to which they are not entitled, or 
fail to have fully formed identities at all. In this discussion, 
Lindemann rejects the idea that there is a “real self” to be 
discovered (133) and instead seeks to understand how our 
identities evolve over time, and what responsibilities our 
families, friends, and strangers have to participate in that 
evolution (looking at the link between vulnerability and 
special responsibilities) (151).
The final chapters of the book take up the question of when 
to let go of identities (and persons) at the end of life (chapter 
six), and offer a short conclusion about the significance of 
the social conception of personhood and personal identity 
described in the book (chapter seven). The discussion of 
letting go pits the protection of “critical interests” from 
Dworkin (1993) against Jaworska’s (2009) protective stance 
toward the minimal autonomy of people with dementia, 
who may appear to change course by voicing preferences 
seemingly contrary to their previously espoused wishes. 
Lindemann sides with Dworkin here, noting the importance 
of holding an individual in his identity even if, or perhaps 
particularly when, he is flailing and scared in the face of 
death. While the social conception of personhood adds 
an intriguing twist to this debate, I am not convinced that 
Lindemann gets it right, given her recognition of the ways 
that our identities can change in response to difficult 
circumstances. I look forward to continued discussions of 
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involvement in the associational life of civic society—while 
also leaving time for some fun” (135).
There is something odd about rereading discussions about 
welfare-state capitalism in a world in which some of its 
critics are beginning to feel some nostalgia about its loss. 
But I think that much of what Fraser has to say in Part One is 
important for what it reveals about our current reality, and 
for what it imagines. Her analyses of need and dependency 
perfectly capture present day political maneuvering 
about federal extensions of unemployment insurance, for 
example. And given the new neoliberal order in which job 
security is a vanishing idea and caregiving responsibilities 
are increasingly privatized, a world in which we all have 
time for some fun seems more important than ever.
Part Two turns to Second Act questions, as Fraser addresses 
identity and social difference. In chapter five, “Against 
Symbolicism: The Uses and Abuses of Lacanianism for 
Feminist Politics,” she argues that Lacanianism is an 
inhospitable resource for feminist theorizing, in contrast to 
pragmatic discourse analysis, which she sees as extremely 
useful for feminist theorizing. She notes that this is not a 
critique of Lacan, but a critique of “an ideal-typical new-
structuralist reading of Lacan that is widely credited among 
English-speaking feminists” (145) and a critique of Julia 
Kristeva. She faults the reading of Lacan for a number of 
reasons. First is its determinism, including the view that 
the subordination of women is “the inevitable destiny 
of civilization” (146). Secondly, she argues that this view 
differentiates identity in a binary fashion: having or lacking a 
phallus. Third, she notes that it cannot account for changes 
in identity across time. Fourth, this view makes social 
solidarity not potentially emancipatory but illusory. Fifth, in 
its focus on the symbolic order, it makes other cultures and 
pluralities of speakers inconceivable. Since Fraser sees a 
rejection of biological determinism, a plurality of identities, 
the possibility of identity changing across time, and 
emancipatory social solidarity as key themes in feminism, 
these flaws are devastating from a feminist perspective. 
She argues that while Julia Kristeva’s work is an initially 
plausible feminist reworking of Lacan, it too fails because 
it “leaves us oscillating between a regressive version of 
gynocentric-maternalist essentialism, on the one hand, and a 
postfeminist anti-essentialism, on the other. Neither of these 
is useful for feminist theorizing” (157). Fraser concludes that 
if Lacanianism is not the answer, and a focus on language is 
instructive to feminist theorizing, then pragmatic discourse 
analysis is the solution. She offers the following advantages 
of pragmatics: it insists on social context and practice, 
studies a plurality of discourses, and understands identity 
as “complex, changing, and discursively constructed” (157).
While I am very sympathetic to Fraser’s preference for 
pragmatic discourse models, I wonder if she hasn’t begged 
the question against Lacanian models by insisting that 
the advantages she cites for a pragmatic model are really 
essential to feminist theorizing. While I want to believe 
that identity is “complex, changing, and discursively 
constructed,” what if I am laboring under an illusion? I think 
there are good reasons in favor of the former view, but it 
needs to be argued for, especially in the face of a great 
deal of feminist theorizing in the Lacanian tradition.
rejects Habermas’s concern that reforms of the domestic 
sphere are intrusions on symbolic reproduction activities 
while reforms of the paid workplace are legitimate, and 
notes that the domestic sphere is thoroughly infused with 
market dynamics, so that reforms must be waged on both 
fronts simultaneously. Fraser concludes by noting the shape 
that a critique of welfare-state capitalism ought to take. 
First, it ought to be cognizant of the thorough integration of 
market dynamics into family functioning. Second, it should 
be sensitive to the “ways in which allegedly disappearing 
institutions and norms persist in structuring social reality” 
(51). Third, it must foreground “the evil of domination and 
subordination” (51).
Chapter two, “Struggle Over Needs,” addresses the 
various discourses that are used to conceptualize need. 
The struggle to win satisfaction of needs proceeds 
through the following stages: first, one must achieve 
political recognition of the need. Next, one must struggle 
to interpret and define the need. Finally, one struggles 
to provide for the need. The state adjudicates between 
these discourses through the vehicle of a bureaucratized 
expert needs discourse. This discourse, administered 
by members of various professional classes, redefines 
needs in terms of “bureaucratically administerable (sic) 
satisfaction” (70) and in terms of states of affairs that could 
affect anyone, like unemployment. Fraser offers two kinds 
of considerations that must be considered and balanced 
in deciding between interpretations of needs. First, she 
argues that consequences must be relevant. Second, she 
argues that we should understand legitimate social needs 
in terms of rights.
Chapter three, “A Genealogy of ‘Dependency’: Tracing a 
Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State,” coauthored with Linda 
Gordon, provides a fascinating account of the concept 
of dependency from its normatively neutral roots in the 
preindustrial era to its entirely negative connation in the 
contemporary world. In the preindustrial era, dependency 
was a fact of life, and dependence on one’s master in the 
feudal era was modeled on dependency on God. In the 
current environment, dependency is a despised, gendered, 
and raced concept, inflected with individual moral and 
personality defects.
Chapter four, “After the Family Wage: A Postindustrial 
Thought Experiment,” considers three alternatives to the 
now largely extinct model of a family existing on one wage. 
The first is the Universal Breadwinner, where everyone 
works in the paid labor force. The second is Caregiver Parity, 
where caregivers are given compensation and recognition 
for the importance of their caregiving activities. While 
she finds something to like about each of these models, 
she notes that both “assume background preconditions 
[such as] . . . major political-economic restructuring . . . 
public control over corporations, the capacity to direct 
investment to create high-quality permanent jobs, and 
the ability to tax profits and wealth at rates sufficient to 
fund expanded high-quality social programs” (133). 
She defends the third, Universal Caregiver, as the only 
postindustrial world compatible with gender justice: “A 
social world in which citizens’ lives integrate wage earning, 
caregiving, community activism, political participation, and 
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Chapters nine, “Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning 
of History,” and ten, “Between Marketization and Social 
Protection: Resolving the Feminist Ambivalence,” may be 
the most controversial chapters in this collection. In these 
chapters, she raises the question of the connection between 
recent feminist theory and the triumph of neoliberalism. 
Her view is twofold: the first is that neoliberalism has 
cunningly availed itself of feminist theory and practice; 
the second is that feminists need to rethink their theory 
and practice in light of both the dangers of neoliberalism 
and its flagrant use of feminist insights and practices. Her 
insights here are telling. She describes, for example, how 
neoliberalism embraced feminism’s preoccupation with 
hierarchies of status rather than explorations of economic 
class. Similarly, feminist concern with the injustice of state-
organized capitalism and welfare state paternalism was a 
great comfort to neoliberals intent on freeing markets from 
state interference.
Nancy Fraser has been, and continues to be, a champion 
of the political-economic analysis even when this analysis 
was out of fashion. She is, however, also committed 
to the view that the subordination of women must be 
separately analyzed and addressed through the lenses of 
misrecognition and misrepresentation. The new crisis of 
neoliberal ideology coupled with rapacious international 
capitalism thoroughly vindicates her commitment to 
socialist feminism, and these essays have certainly 
withstood the test of time. The current crisis of persistent 
unemployment and increasing economic insecurity cannot 
be addressed by a focus solely on problems of recognition. 
But neither can we address these economic problems by 
failing to note their gendered and global dimension. This 
wonderful collection of essays does justice to all these 
approaches while suggesting new ways to bring them into 
conversation.
Hard Feelings: The Moral Psychology of 
Contempt
Macalester Bell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
292 pages. $49.95. ISBN: 9780199794140.
Reviewed by Devora Shapiro
SOUTHERN OREGON UNIVERSITY, SHAPIROD@SOU.EDU
Macalester Bell, author of Hard Feelings: The Moral 
Psychology of Contempt, gives a four-fold definition of 
the moral emotion “contempt.” First, contempt is “partially 
constituted by an appraisal of the status of the object of 
contempt” (37); second, it is a “globalist response towards 
persons” (40); third, contempt must have a “comparative 
or reflexive element” (41); and fourth, contempt initiates a 
withdrawing from the condemned (44). She constructs her 
project largely as a defense of contempt as a moral emotion; 
from beginning to end, she engages with naysayers, 
acknowledging likely objections and demonstrating the 
flaws in such objections.
In the process of defending contempt as a moral emotion, 
Bell constructs an engaging and effective argument for the 
Chapter six, “Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A 
Two-Dimensional Approach to Gender Justice,” argues that 
a feminist focus on recognition alone fails as an analysis 
of and solution to problems facing women today. Fraser 
argues that an analysis of gender and a principle of gender 
justice must combine concerns with redistribution along 
with concerns about recognition. Redistribution focuses 
on the political economy where women are disadvantaged 
both in the family and in the paid work force. Recognition 
focuses on the cultural arena where androcentrism holds 
sway. While she insists that these two realms have some 
interaction, she also claims that no solution which ignores 
one of them will be sufficient to address the subordination of 
women. In chapter seven, “Heterosexism, Misrecognition, 
and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler,” she reiterates 
this claim: “both sides have legitimate claims. Social justice 
today . . . requires both redistribution and recognition; 
neither alone will suffice” (186). The principle of justice 
she argues for is the principle of “parity of participation 
. . . justice requires social arrangements that permit all 
(adult) members of society to interact with one another 
as peers” (164). Two conditions must be satisfied for 
participatory parity. First, every member must have access 
to the material resources that allow independence and 
standing in the conversation. Second, all members must 
be seen as entitled to equal respect and equal opportunity 
for self-esteem. She illustrates how these principles work 
in a number of examples. One instructive example is the 
French banning of the foulard (head scarf) in state schools. 
This example illustrates the dual use of the principle that 
she advocates when cultural and gender issues intersect. 
First, she argues that we should apply the principle to the 
culture. In this case we ask whether the ban is an unjust 
treatment of Muslim community values. Next, she says that 
we must ask whether these norms subordinate women. 
The answer to the first question is clear: Christian crosses 
are not banned in state schools, while the answer to the 
second question is more controversial.
These two chapters combine the concerns of both Part One 
and Part Two by showing that neither set of concerns is 
alone sufficient to theorize or address the subordination of 
women. While there are a number of questions that remain, 
I think she has made a very persuasive case.
The essays in Part Three situate feminist theory and practice 
in the global, neoliberal world. She begins, in chapter 
eight, “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World,” by 
adding to her account of justice, which previously focused 
on redistribution of resources and access to recognition 
and self-esteem, a third dimension: the political. This 
dimension is concerned with representation: the criteria 
of social belonging and the procedures for who can make 
claims for redistribution and recognition. So there are now 
three dimensions of justice that play a role in analyzing and 
responding to the subordination of women: redistribution, 
which concerns the allocation of material resources; 
recognition, which concerns cultural questions of identity 
and exclusion; and representation, which concerns the 
question of who is entitled to make claims of redistribution 
and recognition.
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while still being both “objective and subject-relative” (81). 
What this entails is that there be a third-person, objective 
perspective from which one could identify a contemptuous 
characteristic as the most important of all characteristics, 
to the evaluation at hand. Further, Bell insists on a subject-
relative aspect of moral evaluation as legitimate and 
necessary to our judgments. The subject-relative aspect 
refers to our need (and ability) to take up the subject’s 
perspective with regard to the object of contempt, and 
thus “the fittingness conditions for our globalist emotions 
are contoured by the relationship between the subject and 
target of the emotion” (85). Who the subject is in relation 
to her object of contempt matters to our evaluation of the 
aptness of her contempt, and the importance of the failure 
of the contemned, in relation to his other character traits, 
and in the context of the contemnors evaluation, is relevant 
to the fittingness of her contemptuous response.
The structure of Bell’s account of contempt as rooted in a 
hierarchical societal structure suggests a special focus on 
the vices of superiority, and at what she terms “superbia”: 
essentially the vice of considering oneself superior to 
someone. Superbia “poses a threat to our shared practice 
of morality,” and Bell identifies contempt as the strongest 
and most effective response to superbia’s divisive 
character (162). She explains, “superbia damages our moral 
and personal relationships, and contempt answers that 
damage” (148). It appears that, in the context of superbia, 
apt contempt is the most appropriate response to inapt 
contempt. This is most obviously discernable in instances 
of racism: a vice of superbia that largely displays inapt 
contempt, and is most appropriately challenged with apt 
forms of contempt (203).
Though many critics of contempt site its potency for 
disrupting and dissolving relationships as negative, Bell 
defends the withdrawing from associated with contempt, 
as signifying contempt’s appropriateness in some 
circumstances. Contempt’s ability to address racism brings 
together its fittingness as a response to superbia, with the 
characteristic withdrawing from that it motivates. Bell’s 
discussion of racisim highlights the role that contempt 
plays within a social world that can harbor oppression 
and other systemic political injustices, and she devotes 
chapter five to a closer evaluation of the harms and merits 
of contempt with regard to racism.
Of particular concern to critics is the potential for contempt 
to disproportionately affect victims of stigmatizations in a 
negative way and to a greater degree. Bell rightly highlights 
these critics’ confounding of inapt, racist contempt, with 
the apt contempt that she suggests is an appropriate 
response to racists. She clarifies for these critics that 
“race-based contempt is objectionable,” because as an 
attitude it is “fundamentally at odds with the respect and 
affective openness characteristic of unimpaired moral 
relations” (213). She goes on to defend instances of 
incivility as appropriate resistance, and explains that apt 
counter-contempt is “often the best way of answering this 
objectionable attitude” (226). In this context contempt 
represents an appeal to self-respect, and the rejection of 
the constraints of “civility” is therefore warranted.
acceptance of contempt as a positive moral emotion. She 
articulates the justified form of contempt—apt contempt—
as “a positive moral accomplishment insofar as it answers 
certain faults,” but situates her treatment of the emotion 
outside of the standard discourse, claiming that “it is 
difficult to account for contempt’s positive value using 
the tools of contemporary moral theory” (7). In short, she 
argues that “contempt is an apt response to those who 
evince . . . the vices of superiority” (9).
What comes through as most distinctive about contempt 
for Bell is the hierarchical, stratifying, and status-oriented 
element of contempt. Throughout her work, she refers 
to the necessity of hierarchical status structures to the 
existence of active (rather than passive) contempt. Such 
structural identification is central to what distinguishes 
contempt from “its closest cousin,” disgust,1 and the status 
orientation of contempt is necessary for its “downward 
looking” attitudinal characteristics (54). That is, contempt is 
most notably a social manifestation signifying a politically 
and morally imbued response to persons.
The way in which this is a response to persons, in fact, is 
central to its distinctiveness from the competing moral 
affect that is more accepted in contemporary moral theory: 
resentment. Resentment, unlike contempt, is act-focused, 
rather than global. That is, “resentment” in its standard 
treatment is presented as resting in the self-respect of 
the resenter, and the correlating “holding responsible” of 
the resented for her actions (10). Rather than addressing 
the whole person, resentment is act-focused; we resent 
an agent’s actions, but we condemn whole “persons” as 
contemptible. Bell is clear that she appreciates the use and 
import of “resentment” as a moral affect, but she rejects 
the push to focus on resentment, only, as an adequate 
moral response to persons. Fundamentally, “resentment 
is characteristically focused on wrongdoing as opposed to 
badbeing”; the latter is associated with contempt (163).
Bell addresses what she identifies as “the fittingness 
objection,” insisting that the global nature of contempt 
is consistent with an identification of contempt as a 
potentially positive moral emotion. Objections centered 
around “fittingness” express concern over the identification 
of certain attitudes such as shame and contempt as moral 
because these attitudes may fail to ever properly “fit,” or 
accurately represent, their targets (65). Because contempt, 
like shame, is a “globalizing” emotion, it identifies an entire 
person as “shameful” or “contemptuous,” rather than just 
her actions. But justifying the identification of a person as 
contemptuous would mean, according to critics, that the 
whole person be on the hook for one trait she happens 
to harbor. And, they claim, evaluating a person based on 
one trait of many is inappropriate. Thus, objectors would 
suggest, contempt is never fitting.
Defending contempt as a moral emotion that is both 
globalizing and yet still fitting is one of the most interesting 
claims she makes. In defending contempt in this way, she 
introduces the full force of what she means in presenting 
contempt as containing positional and relational elements 
(80). As a positional and relational, globalist emotion, 
contempt can succeed in meeting the fittingness objection, 
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phenomena to be analyzed. Bell often remarks on the 
cultural dependency of “contempt,” noting that Americans 
may not have a conscious understanding of the emotion, 
pointing to Jane Austen’s beautiful illustrations of the social 
power of contempt, and identifying social hierarchy, itself, 
as a necessary element under-girding the very possibility 
of active contempt.2 She stops short, however, of engaging 
directly with the larger implications of “contempt” as a 
necessarily socially situated, moral emotion.3
Overall, Bell’s Hard Feelings is extremely successful and 
engaging. The strongest feature of this work is that it 
successfully constructs the bridgework needed in order 
for further projects, such as those I outline above, to gain 
traction in mainstream conversations. Bell explains the 
setting and placement of her work very well, and she does 
an excellent job pushing the boundaries of the conversation 
outward, opening up space for further work in many areas 
of philosophy interested in the moral worth and place of 
contempt, as well as other “hard feelings.”
NOTES
1. Along with the absence of nausea in most cases.
2. Active, rather than passive, contempt is the sort that Bell is 
concerned with in her treatment here.
3. With regard to any naturalized approaches to moral psychology.
Identities and Freedom: Feminist Theory 
between Power and Connection
Allison Weir (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 192 
pages. $25.00 ISBN: 0199936889.
Reviewed by Shay Welch
SPELLMAN COLLEGE, SHAYWELCH@GMAIL.COM
In Identities and Freedom: Feminist Theory between Power 
and Connection, Allison Weir argues for a conception of 
identity as a practice of identifying-with, which she believes 
can be a source of freedom. The purpose of the book is 
to reorient feminists’ perspective on and valuation of 
identity. She argues that the typical association of identity 
with liberal conceptions of freedom has generated a static 
understanding of identity that functions as a trap, since the 
liberal focus on individuality qua self-creation produces 
an understanding of identity as a metaphysical category. 
Identity conceived of in this way imparts oppressive 
effects on the identity bearer, given that identities as 
categories are strongly tied to stereotypes about those 
identities. Thus, she argues, there is a paradox of identity 
in connection to freedom, since the markers of freedom 
in the liberal tradition are sources of stasis that ultimately 
reduce the notion of identity to one of sameness. Instead 
of limiting our understanding of identity to one bound by 
liberal conceptions of freedom, Weir suggests that we 
understand identity through a plurality of freedoms. More 
specifically, she maintains that a dynamic conception of 
identity that evolves out of practices of identifying-with 
must be located within a framework of social freedom, 
which is the freedom to flourish and to live a meaningful 
life through one’s connections to others. Weir constructs 
Bell’s defense of contempt as a moral emotion is both 
timely and well executed. She also addresses the role 
of contempt in forgiveness and reconciliation, which are 
both very important aspects for consideration, and likely 
of import to many readers here. In the remainder of this 
review, however, I would like to focus more pointedly on 
some already noted issues that may be of particular interest 
to readers with a focus in feminist and social philosophy 
and theory.
From the perspective of a general philosophical audience, 
Bell’s work addresses central issues and objections 
to “contempt” as a moral emotion, and she does this 
very well. Bell often points to and invokes glaring social 
issues that an acceptance of the moral value of contempt 
appears to connect with, and she does this most effectively 
when she identifies race and racism as the foreground of 
many disturbing displays of inapt contempt. She does 
this, however, from a position that is often situated from 
within the traditional narrative of mainstream philosophy, 
and seems to shy away from engaging these issues too 
far outside the constraints of the traditionally proscribed 
debates in contemporary moral theory.
Bell’s project is understandably responsive to central 
concerns about contempt that arise for contemporary 
moral theory’s attachment to an “ethics of action” (16), 
given that she rightly identifies such theories as dominant 
in the literature. She also engages cognitive theories of 
emotion and the feeling-based theories of emotion favored 
in the moral psychology literature. Bell does a good job of 
explaining how her defense of contempt must exist outside 
these debates, and she is convincing in her arguments 
for moving beyond the standard repertoire of normative 
theories that philosophers are wont to latch onto. She 
instead requires only a “minimally acceptable morality” as 
support for her defense of contempt (23).
The concern I have is that she does not go far enough in 
pointing out the inadequacies of the standard theoretical 
approaches to capturing the moral importance of powerful 
“negative” emotions, and is tacitly accepting of the use of 
terms such as “inappropriate,” “uncivil,” and “irrational” 
to characterize such emotions, as well as the actions that 
these emotions might motivate. On the one hand, perhaps 
some emotions might be “shameful.” More often, however, 
such terms are used to stack the deck against us; these 
are the terms used from positions of power, to maintain 
control, and promote the Panopticon’s self-policing of the 
oppressed.
The skirting of a more critical engagement with topics 
that directly invoke a multi-layered evaluation of power, 
as well as her avoidance of a more explicit conversation 
regarding the social ontology of “emotion,” results in 
Bell accepting as relevant some basic starting points that 
warrant serious scrutiny. This is evident in her treatment 
of moral psychology, specifically. While she is critical 
of approaches in moral psychology that lack the nuance 
necessary to properly evaluate and value emotions such 
as “contempt,” she stops short of questioning the project 
of investigating moral emotions as if they were natural 
kinds to be discovered, rather than socially entrenched 
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approach. Weir posits that practices of identification can 
be practices of freedom through a combined process of 
authenticity seeking and critical reflection—neither of 
which can be done outside of relations. The authenticity 
of individual identities evolves from an affirmation of one’s 
desires and connections against a background of one’s 
personal history and the history of one’s social category. 
These histories and relational contexts are crucial for the 
purpose of initiating and sustaining critiques of the social 
categories and constructions that generate meaning for 
one’s life. The freedom that one pursues through these 
practices is the freedom to orient oneself in relation to 
defining communities that offer alternative interpretations 
of the constructions the practices challenge. Identity, as 
a source of freedom, then, is about (re)negotiating the 
connections one shares with others, and, importantly, 
securing and sustaining desired but given relations that 
engender one’s sense of belonging. While this argument 
appears to reiterate a multitude of feminist arguments 
regarding autonomy and freedom, Weir’s argument 
stands out insofar as the processes for authenticity and 
critical reflection are not done internally in conjunction 
with recognition of interrelatedness and givenness; 
they are active practices that must occur in the midst of 
and through one’s relations to guide and validate the 
identifications with which the individual ultimately resolves 
for the purpose of resistance and transformation. Weir’s 
argument for practices of identification connected to social 
freedom does more than merge the domains of power and 
connection; she evidences that the two cannot occur apart.
The practice of belonging and the risk of connection are 
intimately wound together through the analyses of home 
and identity politics. Weir’s account of relationality is 
both active and symbiotic; that is, identity is a process 
of identifications with one’s own commitments and with 
others. If an individual adjusts her identifications, others 
with whom she is connected will experience adjustments 
in their own identity. For this reason, practices of belonging 
become central to one’s identity, and those ideals and 
people with which she identifies. In turn, practices of 
belonging are practices of freedom via identity when 
individuals move towards communities that will shore up 
their identifications. Belonging and home, then, become 
entwined, because home is a place of safety, but not 
ideally so. Weir argues that home is not an absolute 
safe space, nor should one expect it to be. Even when 
patriarchal considerations of home are sequestered, the 
home is often a space of conflict because it is a space 
of relationships. Weir emphasizes that conflict is part of 
the practice of belonging and, consequently, there is 
considerable risk in connection because relationships are 
about renegotiating identities that hold individuals and 
relationships together. This is also why she views identity 
politics and the construction of a new “we”—solidarity—
as viable. Social freedom and its practices of identification 
deconstruct the liberal dichotomy between autonomy and 
dependency for the purpose of iterating the necessity of 
belonging to cooperative, but conflicting, communities 
that recognize and navigate relations of power so as to 
yield relations of mutuality and flourishing. This complex 
and cumbersome process is the means of generating 
alternative interpretations and transformative identities 
an analysis of identity as a nuanced, but complex, web of 
interactions among and between relations of power and 
relations of meaning, connection, risk, and solidarity that 
are sources of freedom.
Frequently, feminist theories of freedom regard identity 
as something that must be overcome if freedom is to be 
obtained, because identity is often a product of power 
relations meant to subjugate. However, Weir views this 
opposition between identity and freedom as unwarranted. 
Her conception of identity derives, as I have noted, from 
practices of identifying-with, particularly the practice 
of identifying with one’s commitments, connections, 
and values. These practices are themselves practices of 
freedom. Weir claims that the call of some feminists to 
eliminate identity is unrealistic because women cannot 
simply step out of the processes of social construction that 
determine or contribute to their social location. Because 
identities are socially constructed, we depend on them to 
create and sustain meaning about who we are and what 
we value. She explains that this meaning is what holds 
us together as selves and in relations. For example, Weir 
argues that identity should not be something women aim 
to overcome and transcend, because the resistance to 
power relations and oppression that women have enacted 
historically depict practices of freedom via recreation and 
renegotiation; women as women have, through practices 
of freedom, created resistant identities in response to 
patriarchal conceptions of the category of woman, which 
has allowed the identity to be transformative. When women 
identify with the category of woman, they are identifying 
with the commitments and values of themselves and 
others who thwart subordinating aspects of the identity. 
One particularly powerful claim she makes is that the 
feminist objective to transcend the identity of woman 
diminishes the importance of the work women have put 
into reshaping what it means to be a woman. Additionally, 
to reject identity is to reject the extent to which social 
construction has precluded an identity politics grounded 
in feminist solidarity, as opposed to metaphysical 
sameness. Identity as a practical, ethico-political practice 
must be acknowledged if solidarity is to be achieved, 
because women must be capable of identifying with 
commitments and ideals of women who are differently 
socially constructed and interrelated to one another 
through divergent power relations. When the conception 
of identity is conceived in terms of sameness, solidarity is 
impossible, because women over-simplify, gloss-over, or 
denigrate experiences of women unlike themselves. The 
practice of identification is a practice of asking oneself to 
whom and what one is connected and committed. Weir 
argues that when identification as a practice of affirmation 
of commitments and relations replaces the static concept 
of identity, space opens for the creation of a “we” for the 
purpose of and struggle for freedom.
There are three significant contributions that Weir’s 
conception of identity makes to feminist theories of 
freedom: practices of identification as sources of social 
freedom, practices of belonging, and the importance of 
risk in connection. While analyses of social freedom have 
been developed, the relationship she articulates between 
identity and freedom evolves from a highly original 
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of the possibility of unity, or they theorize from a non-
ideal perspective that moves them quickly to the place of 
irresolvable difference. Weir’s conclusion that home and 
belonging will be a difficult place to occupy is haunting but 
accurate. Relationships are never secure, are never without 
struggle. Relationships are always lived as sources of pain, 
but if they are healthy relationships, the pain experienced 
in connection can generate stronger bonds through the 
commitment to one another. That Weir acknowledges and 
embraces the reality of persistent turmoil in connection 
as a source of or path towards freedom individually and 
collectively is a fresh perspective on a lived experience 
that many feminists seem to want to gloss over for fear of 
frustrating liberation politics and coalitions.
Overall, Weir’s insightful project reorients her audience 
anew to the importance and potential of identity for 
freedom. But most importantly, Weir’s development of 
risk in connection as a facet of belonging will transfigure 
her audience’s outlook on how feminists can and should 
pursue freedom together. 
CONTRIBUTORS
Alison Bailey is a professor of philosophy at Illinois 
State University where she also directs the Women’s and 
Gender Studies Program. She has published on issues at 
the intersections of feminist theory, philosophy of race/
whiteness studies, and epistemology. Her recent scholarship 
includes “White Talk as a Barrier to Understanding the 
Problem of Whiteness” (What Is It Like to Be a White 
Problem, 2014); “On White Shame and Vulnerability” 
(South African Journal of Philosophy, 2011); “Reconceiving 
Surrogacy: Towards a Reproductive Justice Account of 
Indian Surrogacy” (Hypatia, 2011); “On Intersectionality 
and White Feminist Philosophy” (The Center Must Not Hold: 
White Women Philosophers on the Whiteness of Philosophy, 
2010); “On Intersectionality, Empathy, and Feminist 
Solidarity” (The Journal of Peace and Justice Studies, 2008); 
and “Strategic Ignorance” (Race and Epistemologies of 
Ignorance, 2007). She co-edited The Feminist Philosophy 
Reader (2008) with Chris Cuomo, and currently co-edits, 
with Ann Garry, the “Feminist Philosophy” category for 
PhilPapers. She serves on the editorial boards for Hypatia 
and the new Lexington Books Philosophy of Race series.
Amandine Catala is an assistant professor of philosophy at 
the University of Quebec at Montreal. She received her Ph.D. 
in philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder. 
Prior to joining UQAM, she was a postdoctoral and visiting 
fellow at the London School of Economics, the Australian 
National University, and the University of Louvain. Her 
current research focuses on secession and territorial rights.
Jane Duran is a lecturer in black studies and the Gevirtz 
Graduate School of Education at the University of California 
at Santa Barbara. She has also been a visiting fellow in 
the department of philosophy. She has a special interest 
in analytic epistemology and in the work of women 
philosophers, and some of her most recent books include 
Eight Women Philosophers (2005), Women, Philosophy, and 
necessary to overcome the oppressive tendencies that 
have attached to identity perceived as a category, and 
it relies on an initial experience of disidentification that 
reveals that one does not necessarily belong to a group 
that one has been assigned by others.
Disidentification not only underlies an individual’s process 
of developing a resistant identity, it also grounds identity 
politics, because solidarity exacts recognition of the 
power dynamics that exist between individuals before 
they can begin to critically evaluate and transform their 
identifications with others. Thus, disidentification and 
solidarity are brought together through needed dissent and 
conflict between individuals in connection so that shared 
interests and needs can be uncovered. For Weir, dissent 
and conflict, the risk of connection, are foundational for 
practices of engagement and openness that reveal division 
for the purposes of identify formation. This is one of the 
important reasons why she maintains the significance of 
home; home is prone to conflict, but home can also be the 
safe space in which individuals can struggle together in a 
practice of belonging, which is a practice of creating unity 
in identifications. Like the belonging of home, solidarity 
will never call for a resolution of struggle, but it will permit 
a continual transformation through that practice, so that 
continually renewed conceptions and understandings 
of “we” can emerge for the purpose of resistance. Weir 
utilizes the notion of world-traveling to demonstrate 
how struggle and conflict can open new mechanisms 
of meaning production and narrative in relations, and 
argues that the active relationality that obtains can and 
should drive reciprocal incorporation and amendments to 
identification with others and their commitments. Solidarity 
as belonging and a place of home, all in pursuit of freedom 
through identity, calls for individuals to expand themselves 
through learning about others with whom they are or desire 
to be connected. One of her most powerful claims is that 
these practices and processes are effective for solidarity 
because they cannot be engaged, differences and dissent 
cannot be addressed, without producing a change in the 
individual.
Weir’s analysis of the connection between identity and 
freedom appears subtle during a cursory read. Very few, 
if any, of her arguments would be regarded as opposed 
to or inconsistent with many mainstream feminist 
arguments. Even her controversial claim that solidarity 
can be achieved is carefully embedded in the arguments 
of activists and theorists of color in order to address the 
dangers of identity and sameness in usual understandings 
of identity politics. What Weir does that is unique is simply 
shift the conversation away from identity as it is typically 
conceived to a more dynamic but nuanced understanding 
of the notion qua practices that generates significant 
and original conclusions and implications. That is, her 
approach is cautious and subtle, but her argument has 
considerable impact on how feminists should regard and 
employ identity for the purpose of attaining liberation. 
But her most outstanding argument is her recognition 
and appreciation of conflict and dissent in belonging—
risk in connection. Of all the dichotomies Weir addresses, 
one particular dichotomy is more implicit or is assumed. 
Typically, feminists theorize from an optimistic perspective 
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Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Her third 
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ANNOUNCEMENTS
Two great conferences are being held together! Villanova 
Conference Center, Villanova University, May 28–30, 2015
HYPATIA: EXPLORING COLLABORATIVE 
CONTESTATIONS
We are happy to announce the call for papers or panels 
for the 2015 Hypatia conference. This year’s theme, 
Exploring Collaborative Contestations, aims to create a 
space for diverse perspectives, difficult conversations, 
and marginalized voices within feminist philosophy. We 
welcome papers and panel proposals on topics that 
address a commitment to diversity, broadly construed; an 
openness to disagreement among feminists on difficult 
issues; and opportunities for collaboration among feminist 
philosophers within and across various disciplines, 
subfields, and theoretical orientations. Submissions on 
any topic in feminist philosophy will be considered. The 
submission deadline for 250–500 word proposals for papers 
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and feminist theory.
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Rita Manning is a professor of philosophy at San José State 
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(coauthored by Scott Stroud, Westview Press) and Social 
Justice in a Diverse Society (co-edited with René Trujillo, 
Mayfield Press). She has published articles and book 
chapters in the fields of moral philosophy, applied ethics 
(business ethics, health care ethics, and environmental 
ethics), philosophy of law, social and political philosophy, 
feminism, and critical thinking. Her most recent works are 
“Immigration Detention and the Right to Health Care,” in 
Global Bioethics and Human Rights: Contemporary Issues 
(Wanda Teays et al., eds., Rowman & Littlefield), and 
“Punishing the Innocent: Children of Incarcerated and 
Detained Parents” (Criminal Justice Ethics).
Kate Parsons is associate professor and chair of the 
philosophy department at Webster University in Saint 
Louis. She teaches courses in several interdisciplinary 
programs, including women and gender studies, 
sustainability studies, the Center for Ethics, and the Institute 
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies.
Sally J. Scholz is professor of philosophy at Villanova 
University. Her research is in social and political philosophy 
and feminist theory. She is the author of On de Beauvoir 
(2000), On Rousseau (2001), Political Solidarity (2008), 
and Feminism: A Beginner’s Guide (2010). Scholz has also 
published articles on violence against women, oppression, 
and just war theory, among other topics. She has served on 
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• Ideal worker/philosopher
• Creating and using demographic data
• Collaborating with social scientists
• The consequences of sexual, gender, racial, 
disability, and sexuality harassment
• Implications for survivors
• Implications for departments/communities in 
which there is harassment
• Implications for the discipline
• Bystander training (empowering community 
members to create an environment that doesn’t 
tolerate harassment)
• Analyses of cronyism and alienation for women 
and members of other marginalized groups
• Intersectionality
• Structural intersectionality in the academy
• Putting intersectional analysis to work in the 
profession
• Political intersectionality transforming the 
discipline
• Embracing the range of philosophical careers
• Academic philosophers outside four-year colleges 
and universities)
• Philosophers in other disciplines
Additional features of the 2015 Hypatia conference:
• Professional workshops on publishing feminist 
philosophy in journals, anthologies, books, blogs, 
and more hosted by the Hypatia local board
• The APA Diversity Summit, May 29, 2015, during 
the conference
• Workshop on sexual harassment and bystander 
training
• APA/CSW Site Visit training: May 31 at Villanova
• Modest travel grants available for presenters in 
need
Presenters are encouraged to submit papers to Hypatia: A 
Journal of Feminist Philosophy after the conference. The 
Hypatia editorial office is committed to rapid review for all 
papers affiliated with the conference.
or panels is January 1, 2015. Submissions must be made 
through the online submission form on the conference 
website.
Suggested topics include the following:
• Exploring intersectionality: race, ethnicity, 
sexuality, gender, social class, disability
• Engaging disability studies within philosophy: 
ethics, politics, epistemology, metaphysics
• Exploring new connections with philosophies of 
race and ethnicity
• Theorizing LGBTQ coalitions among philosophers 
and within philosophy
• Working through and across borders of disciplines: 
interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, and 
multidisciplinarity
• Building on constructive disagreements within 
feminist philosophy
• Exploring new connections for feminist theorizing: 
activism, youth movements, transnational alliances
• Challenging philosophical subfields
• Occupying: resistance and repercussions in the 
profession
APA/CSW: DIVERSITY IN PHILOSOPHY
The APA/CSW conference seeks to examine and address 
the underrepresentation of women and other marginalized 
groups in philosophy. Participants are invited to focus on 
hurdles and best practices associated with the inclusion 
of underrepresented groups. The submission deadline for 
250–500 word proposals is January 1, 2015. Submissions 
must be made through the online submission form.
Suggested topics include:
• Subverting canons, old and new
• Undergraduate pedagogy
• Graduate pedagogy
• Continuing education for established philosophers
• Critical thinking, epistemic diversity, and relativism
• Ethical and epistemic benefits to creating diverse 
philosophical communities
• Theoretical and quantitative empirical approaches 
to inclusion and exclusion
• Stereotype threat
• Implicit bias
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team has worked hard to expand the index’s coverage to 
additional languages and include older material as part of 
the index, some gaps remain. The incorporation of PRI is 
expected to make PhilPapers much more complete. It will 
without doubt be the most complete index of philosophical 
research available. The joint database will also incorporate 
thesaurus data that belong to PDC.
There will be no change to PhilPapers’ access policies. The 
service will continue to be available on the model where 
non-institutional use is free and only institutions located in 
high-GDP countries and that offer degrees in philosophy 
are asked to subscribe. Institutional users will benefit from 
this agreement by leveraging existing accounts with PDC to 
manage PhilPapers subscriptions. Additionally, an optional 
bundle of PhilPapers and other services provided by PDC 
will be offered.
We are also pleased to announce important upgrades 
to PhilPapers. Our search system has been upgraded to 
improve the relevance of search results returned. OpenURL/
SFX linking, which enables users to access resources 
through their institutional libraries, has been improved to be 
more readily available for users affiliated with subscribing 
institutions. More upgrades are coming soon.
THE ASSOCIATION FOR FEMINIST ETHICS AND 
SOCIAL THEORY (FEAST)
FEAST invites submissions for the fall 2015 conference.
Contested Terrains: Women of Color, 
Feminisms, and Geopolitics
October 1–4, 2015
Sheraton Sand Key Resort, Clearwater Beach, Florida
Submission deadline: February 27, 2015
Keynote speakers:
Kimberlé Crenshaw, distinguished professor of law at UCLA 
and Columbia and founder of the African-American Policy 
Forum. An international activist, Crenshaw is well known 
for her foundational scholarly work on intersectionality 
and critical race theory. Professor Crenshaw’s publications 
include Critical Race Theory (edited by Crenshaw et 
al., 1995) and Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, 
Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (with Matsuda 
et al., 1993). Her work on race and gender was influential in 
drafting the equality clause in the South African Constitution, 
and she helped facilitate the inclusion of gender in the U.N. 
World Conference on Racism Declaration. In the United 
States, she served as a member of the National Science 
Foundation’s committee to research violence against 
women and assisted the legal team representing Anita Hill.
Sunera Thobani, associate professor at the Institute 
for Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Social Justice at the 
University of British Columbia. A founding member of RACE 
(Researchers and Academics of Colour for Equity) and a 
past president of Canada’s National Action Committee on 
Conference website: http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/
artsci/hypatiaconference/
For accessibility planning in action, please contact 
the conference coordinator at editorialassistant@
hypatiaphilosophy.org.
Sponsored by Hypatia, the APA Committee on the Status 
of Women, and the College of Arts and Sciences, Villanova 
University.
PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES
Submitted by Jami Anderson
Philosophical Profiles is a new series of interviews with 
distinguished and influential philosophers working on a 
range of issues of interdisciplinary interest, from political 
philosophy, the rights and status of children, bioethics, 
sex, and gender, the nature of free will, personhood, right 
through to the physical structure of the universe. Each 
philosopher discusses his or her particular area of focus 
and how he or she became interested in that area in a 
way that should be accessible to a general audience. The 
production of Philosophical Profiles is under the aegis of 
the Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics.
THE PHILPAPERS FOUNDATION
Submitted by David Bourget and David Chalmers, Directors, 
The PhilPapers Foundation 
The PhilPapers Foundation and the Philosophy 
Documentation Center will be joining forces to bring 
the best possible research index to the community of 
philosophers.
The Philosophy Documentation Center (PDC) is a non-
profit organization dedicated to providing affordable 
access to essential resources in the humanities and social 
sciences. PDC supports scholarly work in many fields 
with customized publishing and membership services, 
digitization solutions, and secure hosting. PDC produces 
the Philosophy Research Index, a database of bibliographic 
information on articles, books, reviews, dissertations, and 
other documents in philosophy comprising over 1.3 million 
entries. The Philosophy Research Index is currently the 
largest research index in philosophy, with more entries 
than PhilPapers (1.1 million entries) and the Philosophers’ 
Index (540,000 entries).
The agreement between PDC and the PhilPapers Foundation 
has two main components. First, the Philosophy Research 
Index (PRI) database will be incorporated as part of 
PhilPapers. Second, PDC will become responsible for 
the management of PhilPapers subscriptions, lending 
to PhilPapers its extensive expertise with this type of 
operation.
PhilPapers users can expect PhilPapers’ index to grow 
significantly over the coming weeks as a result of the 
integration of PRI. PhilPapers has traditionally been 
focused on recent publications in English. In contrast, PRI 
has excellent coverage of older publications and very good 
coverage of non-English publications. While the PhilPapers 
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Topics to consider may include, but are not limited to the 
following:
• Situated knowledges, including the racialized 
terrains of knowledge production
• Intersectional theories of space and place
• “Women of color,” “third-world women,” “women 
of the global South,” “postcolonial women,” and 
other descriptors as contested identifications
• Tensions between white/U.S. feminism, women 
of color feminisms, third-world feminisms, and 
transnational feminisms
• Women’s agency and autonomy as contested 
feminist assumptions
• Contested conceptions of home and homelands
• The different social locations and embodied 
experiences of racism
• Perspectives on trauma and violence, terrorism 
and conspiracy, security and danger
• The geopolitics of mobility and immobility, 
including tourism, migration, detention, and 
deportation
• Gatekeeping geographies, technologies of 
surveillance, and border patrols
• The geopolitics of intimacy, including the racialized 
affective labor of mail order brides, transracially 
and transnationally adopted children and migrant 
domestic workers
• Geopolitical analyses of neo-liberalism, global 
capitalism, and militarism, including their effects 
on women of color
• Ecofeminisms and resource conflicts
• Solidarity movements among diverse groups of 
women of color and white feminists
Call for abstracts: Difficult conversations
A signature event of FEAST conferences is a lunch-time 
“Difficult Conversation” that focuses on an important, 
challenging, and under-theorized topic related to feminist 
ethics or social theory.
In keeping with this year’s theme of Contested Terrains, 
this year our topic for the difficult conversation panel 
is Damage by Allies. This conversation hopes to provide 
an environment conducive to dialogue for and among 
women of color and white academics concerning the harm 
that can be done by well-meaning feminist allies who, 
despite possible commonalities of values, can sometimes 
undermine the viewpoints and work of women of color. We 
the status of Women, Thobani’s research focuses on critical 
race, postcolonial and feminist theory, globalization, 
citizenship, migration, Muslim women, the War on Terror, 
and media. Professor Thobani is the author of Exalted 
Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in 
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2007) and numerous 
other works. As a public intellectual, Thobani is well known 
for her vocal opposition to Canadian support of the U.S.-led 
invasion into Afghanistan.
Invited Sessions:
• Invited panel honoring the work of María Lugones
• Invited panel on U.S. wars/imperialism and the 
women within
FEAST encourages submissions related to this year’s 
theme. However, papers on all topics within the areas of 
feminist ethics and social theory are welcome.
Description of this year’s theme
Engaging in feminist theory in the twenty-first century 
requires placing emphasis on the “where” of its production. 
Such an emphasis includes considering the situated 
perspectives and geopolitical locations out of which a 
given theory is produced. Another equally important part 
of contemporary engagement in feminist theory concerns 
appreciating the ways that theory travels and changes 
through the traveling. The notion of contested terrains 
is invoked to refer to the many junctures of perspective, 
location, and travel with which feminist theory must 
contend in an era of multinational reception.
For example, it is at the juncture of perspective, location, 
and travel that one finds the often contested political 
identifier “women of color.” The term is contested not only 
because there is no singular “woman of color” perspective 
and/or location but also because of the diversity of possible 
stories of travel in and out of “women of color” spaces. As 
Jacqui Alexander explains, one is not born but becomes a 
woman of color. That “becoming” is by no means a given 
and, for many, “woman of color” is not a personal identifier. 
The term is contested, and its meaning is continually 
recreated through the contesting.
Feminism is practiced and theorized within contested 
terrains in a transnational world. Understanding the 
connections and disputes created by borders, castes, 
classes, and other boundaries is at the heart of geopolitics. 
Feminist geopolitical analyses concern the spaces, places, 
relations of power, and interchange among feminists 
in local, regional, and global contexts, paying careful 
attention to the locations out of which we theorize and 
practice feminism(s).
This year’s FEAST conference invites submissions that take 
up this notion of contested terrains in relation to women of 
color, feminism, and geopolitics. We welcome papers that 
take both theoretical and practical approaches to these 
issues and related issues in feminist ethics, epistemology, 
and political and social theory more broadly construed.
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Difficult conversations and other non-paper submissions 
(e.g., workshops, discussions, etc.)
Please submit an abstract with a detailed description (500–
750 words).
Please clearly indicate the type of submission (Difficult 
Conversation, workshop, roundtable discussion, etc.) both 
in the body of your e-mail and on the submission itself.
For more information on FEAST, or to see programs from 
previous conferences, visit http://www.afeast.org.
Questions about this conference or the submission process 
may be directed to the program chairs, Ranjoo Herr (rherr@
bentley.edu) and/or Shelley Park (Shelley.Park@ucf.edu).
This will be a terrific conference and we look forward to 
receiving your submissions! Please feel free to circulate 
this CFP to your friends and colleagues. Thanks in advance 
for helping us get the word out!
Ranjoo Herr and Shelley Park for the 2015 FEAST Program 
Committee:
Celia Bardwell-Jones
Asha Bhandary
Elora Chowdhury
Natalie Cisneros
Kristie Dotson
Saba Fatima
Nathifa Greene
Ranjoo Herr
Denise James
Serene Khader
Huey-Li Li
Keya Maitra
Lorraine Mayer
Shelley Park
Elena Ruiz
Jennifer Lisa Vest
hope that women of color will be able to bring to light both 
subtle and obvious experiences of damage done by allies 
and open a discussion about how this might be avoided or 
dealt with effectively in the future.
We are soliciting abstracts (see below) that address, in 
both North American and transnational contexts: concrete 
experiences of the sorts of hardship that academics and 
activists of color experience at the hands of allies; well-
intentioned but misplaced pedagogical and political 
strategies; strategies for being a better ally to marginalized 
peoples  in academia and elsewhere; strategies for women 
of color to respond to misplaced attempts at solidarity; and 
effective transnational activism that does not undermine 
the agency of its intended beneficiaries.
Submission guidelines
Please send your submission, in one document (a 
Word file, please, so that abstracts can be posted), to 
FEAST2015submissions@ucf.edu by February 27, 2015.  In 
the body of the email message, please include your paper 
or panel title, name, institutional affiliation, e-mail address, 
surface mail address, and phone number. All submissions 
will be anonymously reviewed.
Individual papers
Please submit a completed paper of no more than 3,000 
words, along with an abstract of 100–250 words, for 
anonymous review. Your document must include: paper 
title, abstract of 100–250 words, and your paper, with no 
identifying information. The word count (max. 3,000) should 
appear on the top of the first page of your paper.
Panels
Please clearly mark your submission as a panel submission 
both in the body of the e-mail and on the submission itself. 
Your submission should include the panel title and all three 
abstracts and papers in one document, along with word 
counts (no more than 3,000 for each paper).
